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IMMATERIAL LIES: CONDONING DECEIT IN
THE NAME OF SECURITIES REGULATION
Stefan J. Padfield†
The message that pervades society is that it’s O.K. to lie—you
can get away with it. One of the things I found in my research
is that when you confront people with their lies, they very
rarely display remorse. Lying is not seen as being morally
reprehensible in any strong way.1
If investor confidence is to come back . . . , the law must
advance.2

† Associate Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law. B.A., Brown
University; J.D., The University of Kansas School of Law. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the 2009 Central States Law School Association Annual Conference held at Capital
University Law School on October 23–24, 2009. My thanks to all the participants for their
helpful comments. The ideas presented in this Article first appeared in shorter form in An
Argument for Reduced Dependence on Materiality in Dismissing Frivolous Lawsuits, 2 J. SEC.
L. REG. & COMPLIANCE 380 (2009). I would like to thank the publishers for all their support.
Finally, I would like to thank The University of Akron School of Law for providing me with a
summer research grant to help me complete this project.
1 Eben Harrell, Why We Lie So Much, TIME (Aug. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1917215,00.html (quoting Robert Feldman, a
professor of psychology at the University of Massachusetts, during a question and answer
session regarding Feldman‘s most recent book, THE LIAR IN YOUR LIFE: HOW LIES WORK AND
WHAT THEY TELL US ABOUT OURSELVES).
2 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383 1383, at 5 (1934). Specifically, the quoted language is from
―then-Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Representative
Sam Rayburn, who sponsored the bill that eventually led to the passage of the 1934 [Securities]
Exchange Act.‖ Elisse B. Walter, Comm‘r, Sec. Exch. Comm‘n, Speech at Northwestern
University School of Law‘s Forty-eighth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute: U.S. SEC
Comm‘r, SEC Rulemaking — ―Advancing the Law‖ to Protect Investors (Oct. 2, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch100209ebw.htm.
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ABSTRACT
The financial crisis of 2008 is raising the issue of investor trust
and confidence in the market once again. Investors are questioning
how managers could have taken such significant risks in the
subprime-lending and credit-default-swap markets without,
apparently, providing adequate disclosure to the market. The pending
flood of lawsuits following in the wake of this financial crisis provides
an opportunity, however, for courts to restore some of this lost trust.
This Article argues that one of the ways courts can do this is by
curtailing their overdependence on using materiality as the basis for
dismissing what they deem to be frivolous lawsuits under Rule 10b-5.
There are at least four good reasons for doing so. First, condoning
managerial misstatements on the basis of immateriality arguably has
a negative impact on investor confidence because whenever courts
find a misstatement to be immaterial as a matter of law they are
effectively concluding that shareholders will receive no relief even
where the statement was made with full knowledge of its falsity and
with the requisite intent to defraud. Second, the materiality ―safety
valve‖ doctrines that have evolved to assist courts in dismissing
frivolous suits are often in direct conflict with Supreme Court
guidance as to both the proper definition and analysis of materiality
in the context of Rule 10b-5. Third, when the courts routinely
categorize managerial misstatements as immaterial to dismiss
frivolous suits, they create a tension with the disclosure rules, which
are premised on ideals of full and fair disclosure and often turn on
materiality determinations. Finally, dependence on materiality is
unnecessary because other elements of Rule 10b-5, such as scienter,
have been strengthened to the point where they allow courts to deal
with frivolous suits without having to rule on materiality.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 10b-53 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 is the primary
vehicle for challenging alleged corporate securities fraud.5 In order to
3
4

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)).
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make out a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that there was
(1) a misrepresentation or actionable omission of fact, (2) that is
material, (3) made with scienter, (4) in connection with the purchase
or sale of security, (5) that was justifiably relied upon by the plaintiff,
and (6) that proximately caused the plaintiff‘s loss.6 A fact is
generally judged to be material in the context of securities regulation
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important in deciding whether to buy or sell a security.7
Put another way, a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable investor would have viewed the fact as significantly
altering the total mix of information available.8 The Supreme Court
has cautioned that materiality is a fact-intensive issue, rarely to be
decided on a motion to dismiss.9
Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson,10 which allowed class action plaintiffs to take advantage of
a ―fraud on the market‖ presumption of reliance, the prospect of
crippling damage awards skyrocketed.11 Concern soon mounted that
the concomitant increase in the potential cost to corporations for
failing to settle these suits would translate into an increase in the
filing of frivolous ―strike suits.‖12 In response to this concern, courts
began to look for various ―safety valves‖ to dismiss these claims. 13

5 See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94
VA. L. REV. 1, 66–67 (2008) (―[F]ederal securities law has several express and implied causes
of action based on misrepresentations. Perhaps the most important antifraud provision is Rule
10b-5 . . . .‖ (footnote omitted)).
6 Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994).
7 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality
in the context of a proxy solicitation); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988)
(adopting the TSC definition of materiality in the context of a purchase or sale of a security).
8 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449.
9 See id. at 450 (―Only if the established omissions are ‗so obviously important to an
investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality‘ is the ultimate issue
of materiality appropriately resolved ‗as a matter of law‘ by summary judgment.‖ (quoting
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970))).
10 485 U.S. at 250.
11 See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009
WIS. L. REV. 151, 153 (2009) (―Soon after Basic, the number of such suits rose dramatically,
adding fuel to the political firestorm of securities class-action lawsuits and eventually leading
Congress to enter the field with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).‖
(footnote omitted)).
12 Another concern was that the costs would be borne by the very individuals allegedly
harmed—the shareholders. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 262 (White, J., concurring and dissenting)
(―And who will pay the judgments won in such actions? I suspect that all too often the
majority‘s rule will ‗lead to large judgments, payable in the last analysis by innocent investors,
for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers.‘‖ (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring))).
13 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 11, at 151 (―In the twenty years since the Supreme
Court of the United States‘ decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, lower court decisions have
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The focus of these safety valves was often the issue of materiality.
Courts used doctrines such as: ―puffery,‖ ―bespeaks caution,‖ ―truthon-the-market,‖ and bright-line rules tied to the price movements of
stock,14 to dismiss claims by concluding that the alleged
misrepresentation or omission was immaterial as a matter of law.
There are a number of problems, however, with overdependence
on materiality safety valves. First, courts‘ repeated declarations that
management is free to lie, so long as that lie is immaterial, arguably
sends the message to executives that it is often okay to embellish the
truth—and sends the message to investors that they should adopt an
attitude of caveat emptor (―buyer beware‖) when it comes to the
statements of corporate executives. One might argue that it is overly
pejorative to characterize these disclosures as lies. However, when a
court grounds dismissal on a finding of immateriality, it is effectively
saying that there is no basis for liability even if it were proven that an
executive misstated the facts with intent to deceive (i.e., there was a
lie).15 Second, the safety valves themselves twist the definition of
materiality to the point that they seemingly make a mockery of the
Supreme Court‘s declarations on the issue. Finally, courts‘ excessive
reliance on these safety valves creates a conflict with the disclosure
rules, which often turn on determinations of materiality. Fortunately,
there is a better way: focusing on the other elements of Rule 10b-5.
With the financial crisis of 2008 raising the issue of investor trust
and confidence in the market once again, investors are questioning
how managers could have taken such significant risks in the subprime
lending and credit default swap markets without apparently providing
adequate disclosure to the market.16 The pending flood of lawsuits
following in the wake of this financial crisis provides an opportunity,

insisted on proof of market efficiency, materiality, and loss causation more stringent than the
Court‘s presumption of reliance seemingly requires.‖).
14 See discussion infra Part II.E.
15 See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 799 (4th ed. 2002)
(defining a lie as ―[a] false statement deliberately presented as being true . . . . Something meant
to deceive or give a wrong impression.‖).
16 See, e.g., SEC Charges Former Officers of Subprime Lender New Century with Fraud,
SEC Litigation Release No. 21327 (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2009/lr21327.htm (―Defendants . . . failed to disclose important negative information,
including dramatic increases in early loan defaults, loan repurchases, and pending loan
repurchase requests.‖); SEC Files Securities Fraud Charges Against Former Countrywide
Executives, SEC Litigation Release No. 21068A (June 4, 2009), available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21068a.htm (―The SEC alleges that Mozilo, Sambol, and
Sieracki actually knew, and acknowledged internally, that Countrywide was writing
increasingly risky loans . . . . Despite these severe concerns about the increasing risks that
Countrywide was undertaking, Mozilo, Sambol, and Sieracki hid these risks from the investing
public.‖).
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however, for courts to restore some of this lost trust by refusing to
label lies immaterial unless absolutely necessary.17
II. BACKGROUND ON THE ELEMENT OF MATERIALITY IN RULE 10B-5
In this Part, I will briefly review the role of Rule 10b-5 in
securities regulation generally, including its various elements. I will
then focus on the definition of the critical element of materiality,
including its fact-intensive nature and questions surrounding the
status of the ―reasonable investor‖ whose judgment is deemed
determinative. Finally, I will conclude this Part by reviewing the
various materiality safety valves that have arisen to assist judges in
dismissing what they deem to be frivolous lawsuits, including the
doctrines of ―puffery,‖ ―bespeaks caution,‖ ―truth-on-the-market,‖
and bright-line price-movement rules.
A. Securities Regulation and the Role of Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in
relevant part that ―[i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o
use . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.‖18 Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to § 10(b), further provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.19
―For more than twenty-five years, the primary private remedy for
fraud available under the Securities Exchange Act has been the one
implied from SEC Rule 10b-5.‖20 Justice Rehnquist has famously
17 Cf. Alison Smale, Leaders in Davos Admit Drop in Trust and Uncertainty Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at A8 (―If there was one takeaway from the annual gathering of business
and political leaders in Davos this year, it was this: trust in governments, corporations and above
all banks has become as elusive as sure footing on the icy streets of this Alpine resort.‖).
18 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006).
19 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting standing of private plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5 to purchasers and
sellers).
20 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.4[1]
(6th ed. 2009). There are meaningful distinctions between the use of Rule 10b-5 in
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characterized the implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 as
―a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn.‖21 While there is much debate, recent empirical work continues
to suggest that this ―judicial oak‖ provides a net gain to society.22
B. The Elements of Rule 10b-5
In order to make out a claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must
prove that there was ―1) a misstatement or omission 2) of material
fact 3) occurring in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,
that 4) was made with scienter and 5) upon which the plaintiff
justifiably relied, 6) and that proximately caused injury to the
plaintiff.‖23 In the following pages, I will explore the concept of
materiality in greater depth and hopefully demonstrate that it has been
excessively and inappropriately relied upon in the rush to dismiss
securities suits deemed to be unmeritorious. I will then explain how
other elements of Rule 10b-5, like scienter and loss causation, are
much better positioned, particularly in light of recent precedent, to
carry the load when it comes to battling frivolous litigation.
Nonetheless, it may be worthwhile to pause briefly here to discuss
one of the elements I do not address in greater depth later—the
necessity of pleading a misstatement.24
It is commonly said that there is no ―fraud by hindsight‖ under our
securities laws.25 To that end, a complaint:
must . . . ―indicate why the alleged misstatements would have
been false or misleading at the several points in time in which

administrative, civil (public and private), and criminal actions. See Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Hell Hath No Fury Like an Investor Scorned: Retribution, Deterrence, Restoration, and the
Criminalization of Securities Fraud Under Rule 10b-5, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 3, 4–5 (2007)
(discussing distinctions between civil and criminal enforcement of Rule 10b-5). I will be
focusing on the private civil context.
21 Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
22 See C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder Litigation,
95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 356 (2010) (―Our study suggests that securities litigation is an effective
disciplining tool for institutional owners.‖); Brian Carson McTier & John K. Wald, The Causes
and Consequences of Securities Class Action Litigation 1 (Apr. 23, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript, at 1), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1393857 (―Overall the results suggest
that class action lawsuits drive firms to reduce overinvestment and increase focus.‖).
23 Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 166 (5th Cir. 1994).
24 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (―The language of § 10(b)
gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception.‖).
25 Cf. Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774 (2004) (―In the
context of securities regulation, hindsight can mistakenly lead people to conclude that a bad
outcome was not only predictable, but was actually predicted by managers.‖).
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it is alleged they were made.‖ Merely alleging ‗‗that
defendants made statements ‗and then showing in hindsight
that [they were] false‘‖ does not satisfy the [Private Securities
Litigation] Reform Act.26
Particularly in the case of litigation related to the subprime-lending
crisis, failure to plead a misstatement may be a particularly viable
basis for dismissal. However, this issue will turn on the contentious
question of who knew what when.
In his book How Markets Fail, John Cassidy makes a strong case
against the proposition that no one knew trouble was brewing in the
housing market before the crisis hit.27 He notes that ―[a]s early as
2002, some commentators, [himself] included, were saying that in
many parts of the country real estate values were losing touch with
incomes.‖28 Furthermore, the assertion by key financial market
players like Jamie Dimon, chief executive officer of J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co., that ―we just missed that housing prices don‘t go up
forever,‖ borders on the incredible.29 Nonetheless, failure to plead a
misstatement should be a viable basis for dismissing frivolous suits in
at least some cases, thereby precluding any need to rely on
materiality.
C. The Definition of Materiality
Materiality has been described as a ―notoriously slippery concept,
‗unpredictable and elusive‘ in application.‖30 Part of the problem is
26 In re MoneyGram Int‘l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 626 F. Supp. 2d 947, 973 (D. Minn. 2009) (first
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Cerner Corp. Sec. Litig., 425 F.3d 1079,
1083 (8th Cir. 2005) and Elam v. Neidorff, 544 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir. 2002)). Fraud by
hindsight may also be relevant to the analysis of scienter. See id. at 981–83 (relying on
combination of external ―red flags,‖ which alone would support only fraud-by-hindsight, and
internal communications to find recklessness).
27 JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES passim
(2009); see also James Kwak, The Cover -Up, THE BASELINE SCENARIO (Apr. 12, 2010, 9:59
PM), http://baselinescenario.com/2010/04/12/magnetar-financial-crisis-cover-up/ (―[P]lenty of
people saw the crisis coming. In late 2009, people like Nouriel Roubini and Peter Schiff were all
over the airwaves for having predicted the crisis. Since then, there have been multiple books
written about people who not only predicted the crisis but bet on it, making hundreds of millions
or billions of dollars for themselves.‖). But see Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, Securities Litigation
and the Housing Market Downturn, 35 J. CORP. L. 97, 119 (2009) (―[W]e conclude that the
evidence is consistent with the proposition that the serious housing market downturn was not
generally foreseen by sophisticated market participants prior to the fourth quarter of 2007.‖).
28 CASSIDY, supra note 27, at 18.
29 Jim Kuhnhenn & Daniel Wagner, Bankers Apologize for Actions That Led to Crisis,
ABC NEWS, Jan. 13, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9547906.
30 Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the
Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317, 319 (2007) (quoting SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.,
565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977)). See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance
in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (2003)
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that in application, the standard is supposed to strike an efficient
balance between informing investors on the one hand, while not
burying them in unnecessary information on the other. As the
Supreme Court noted in Basic, ―certain information concerning
corporate developments could well be of ‗dubious significance.‘‖31 It
was important, the Court noted, that the standard for defining
materiality was not set too low because ―a minimal standard
might . . . lead management ‗simply to bury the shareholders in an
avalanche of trivial information.‘‖32 On the other hand, in the very
same opinion the Court firmly rejected the notion that investors
should be spared the details of what goes on during premerger
negotiations because they might not be able to discount the
information properly.
The . . . rationale . . . stands soundly rejected . . . . ―It assumes
that investors are nitwits, unable to appreciate—even when
told—that mergers are risky propositions up until the
closing.‖ Disclosure, and not paternalistic withholding of
accurate information, is the policy chosen and expressed by
Congress.33
And the difficult line drawing is not limited to premerger
negotiations or inside information about subprime exposure, but also
includes issues like the health status of important corporate insiders.
For example, is the health of Apple Inc.‘s Steve Jobs material to
investors?34

(―The facial simplicity of the basic legal standard governing materiality masks the complexities
encountered by transaction planners, litigants, the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘),
and courts in interpreting and applying that standard.‖).
31 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)).
32 Id. (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448).
33 Id. at 234 (quoting Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1987)).
34 See Yukari Iwatani Kane & Joann S. Lublin, Apple Mum On Jobs’s Treatment,
Diagnosis, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at B1 (―Apple and its directors have consistently kept a
tight lid on Mr. Jobs‘s health, even though the CEO is regarded as key to the company‘s strategy
and direction.‖); cf. id. (―In 1992, Steven J. Ross, who was then chairman and co-CEO of Time
Warner Inc., died after a year-long battle with prostate cancer. The media giant said Mr. Ross
was still running the show during much of that time. He actually was working from home only a
few hours a day, a friend later said.‖). See generally Allan Horwich, When the Corporate
Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill: When Is a Corporation Obligated to Disclose That Illness and
Should the Securities and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5 N.Y.U.
J. L. & BUS. 827 (2009) (analyzing public corporations‘ legal obligations to disclose facts about
the health of their ―luminary‖ employees); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About
Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor
Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 756–57 (2007) (arguing an executive's personal
information may be material for purposes of securities regulation). It is important to note here

12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM

152

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

In the following Sections, I will explore the key aspects of the
definition of materiality under Rule 10b-5. I will start with the basic
definition set forth by the Supreme Court in its TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.35 and Basic decisions. I will then take a closer look at
the fact-intensive nature of the application of that definition, as well
as questions surrounding the ―reasonable investor‖ whose perspective
we are to take when applying the definition.
1. The TSC/Basic Definitions
In TSC Industries, the Supreme Court considered a claim of fraud
in connection with a proxy solicitation under Rule 14a-936 and
concluded that ―[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important
in deciding how to vote.‖37 Alternatively, the Court held that ―there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‗total mix‘ of information made available.‖38
This standard was later carried over to the Rule 10b-5 context.39
As discussed above, the Court rejected the view that ―all facts
which a reasonable shareholder might consider important‖ were
material for purposes of securities regulation.40 It did so because ―if
the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low . . . the corporation
and its management [may] be subjected to liability for insignificant
omissions or misstatements, . . . [and this] may cause it simply to bury
the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information.‖41 On the
other hand, the Court cautioned that satisfying one‘s burden as to

that silence, even when in possession of material information, does not create liability under the
securities laws absent a duty to speak. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)
(―[O]ne who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction
commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do so.‖).
35 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
36 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2010) (prohibiting certain false or misleading statements in
connection with the solicitation of proxies).
37 426 U.S. at 449.
38 Id. Some courts have relied solely on the ―total mix‖ definition of materiality. 5C
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE & REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS § 12:32 (2010)
(collecting cases).
39 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (―We now expressly adopt the
TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.‖); cf. id. at 238
(concluding that the definition of materiality in the context of speculative information or
contingent events—like premerger negotiations—turned on a balancing of the probability and
magnitude of the event).
40 TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 445 (quoting Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324,
330 (7th Cir. 1975)).
41 Id. at 448.
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materiality ―does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable
investor to change his vote.‖42 Rather, ―[w]hat the standard does
contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual
significance in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.‖43
2. A Fact-Intensive Analysis
The courts frequently utter a common refrain asserting that the
analysis of materiality is extremely fact-intensive and thus is rarely to
be decided on the basis of pretrial motions to dismiss or summary
judgment. The Supreme Court itself has declared that ―[o]nly if the
established omissions are ‗so obviously important to an investor, that
reasonable minds cannot differ on the question of materiality‘ is the
ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved ‗as a matter of
law‘ by summary judgment.‖44 Nonetheless, courts frequently dismiss
securities cases based on immateriality.45 As Professors Bainbridge
and Gulati note, this result is, at first blush, puzzling:
[I]f a high percentage of securities disclosure cases are
dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage on grounds that the
information in question was immaterial, but each opinion has
in it the caveat that materiality is ordinarily an issue for the
finder of fact, and it is only in the rare case that it can be
decided at the motion to dismiss stage, things do begin to
look suspicious.46

Id. at 449.
Id.
44 Id. at 450 (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129–30 (4th Cir.
1970)); see also id. (noting that materiality determinations are ―peculiarly ones for the trier of
fact‖).
45 See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002) (―Of the 91 (out of 100) cases that were decided at the motion
to dismiss stage, 64 involved materiality determinations in favor of the defendants (i.e., over 70
percent.‖); David A. Hoffman, The ―Duty‖ To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV.
537, 542 (2006) (―In this Article, I present evidence that courts dismiss securities claims on the
ground of presumed immateriality in half of opinions considering materiality.‖). But see
Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class Actions:
An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs 34 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 09-016 and N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 09-34, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457085 (listing materiality as
fifth basis for dismissal in a review of Supreme Court securities class actions). As to the Choi &
Pritchard study, it is worth noting that if one combines ―Forward Looking Safe Harbor,‖
―Materiality,‖ and ―Puffery‖ into one category, it ranks second behind only scienter. See id.
46 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 45, at 115 (internal quotations omitted).
42
43
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A possible answer to this puzzle is that courts use materiality
determinations as a safety valve for frivolous litigation, which is only
effective47 if the pressure is released pretrial.
3. No Bright-Line Rules
In addition to the admonition that materiality is largely a question
of fact (though ultimately a mixed question of fact and law) rarely to
be decided pretrial, the Supreme Court has also warned against the
use of bright-line rules.48 Specifically, while the Supreme Court
acknowledged, ―[a] bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a
standard that requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the
circumstances,‖ it ultimately concluded that ―ease of application
alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts
and Congress‘ policy decisions.‖49 Thus, ―[a]ny approach that
designates a single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an
inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily
be overinclusive or underinclusive.‖50
Having briefly discussed the basic definition of materiality, as well
as its fact-intensive nature and incompatibility with bright-line rules, I
want to round out this initial exploration of the definition of
materiality with an examination of the requirement that we take the
perspective of the ―reasonable investor‖ in conducting an analysis of
materiality under Rule 10b-5. Who is a ―reasonable investor‖ for
purposes of materiality determinations? This is not at all clear.
4. Who is the Reasonable Investor and Why Don’t
We Ask Her What She Thinks?51
The Wheat Report52 summarized the dilemma of defining the
reasonable investor as follows:
At what audience should disclosure be aimed? Is the literature
elicited by the Commission‘s requirements intended primarily
See discussion infra Parts III.B.
See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450 (―The issue of materiality may be characterized as a
mixed question of law and fact, involving as it does the application of a legal standard to a
particular set of facts.‖).
49 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988).
50 Id.
51 Cf. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the
Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291 (2009) (discussing
women as investors and whether the reasonable investor is a woman).
52 SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
POLICIES UNDER THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACTS (The Wheat Report) (1969), available at
http://sechistorical.org/museum/papers/1960.
47
48
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to aid the unsophisticated? Is it, on the contrary, designed to
assist the assiduous student of finance who searches for every
clue to the intrinsic value of securities? Or should the
Commission strive to meet the needs of a hypothetical
―reasonable‖ investor of ―reasonable‖ sophistication?
Throughout its history, the Commission has struggled with
these questions. They may well be unanswerable.53
More recently, I commented that a review of the cases revealed
conceptions of the reasonable investor ―stretching from
‗sophisticated‘ to ‗average‘ to ‗naïve.‘‖54
It seems clear, as far as the SEC is concerned, that the reasonable
investor, for purposes of materiality determinations, is the
unsophisticated retail investor.55 As Donald Langevoort has noted:
―The Securities and Exchange Commission thinks of itself as the
investors‘ advocate, by which it means retail investors—individuals
and households—as opposed to institutional investors.‖56 He goes on
to point out that the ―history of rules, interpretations, and enforcement
by the SEC is filled with references to both the need to promote retaillevel investor confidence to give depth and liquidity to the nation‘s
financial markets and the desire to level the playing field between the
meek and the privileged.‖57 This in spite of the fact that, ―[t]he last
thirty years or so have brought a rapid shift toward institutionalization
in the financial markets in the United States—in other words, a shift
toward investment by mutual funds, pension funds, insurance
companies, bank trust departments, and the like.‖58 Meanwhile, Joan
MacLeod Heminway has noted that court cases ―indicate expressly or
impliedly that the reasonable investor is a sophisticated trader, an
experienced participant in securities markets who researches

53 Id. at 51–52; cf. Stanley Keller, Securities Act Reform, in 1 36TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE
SECURITIES REGULATION 1021, 1023 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2004) (―[A] Commission
study chaired by Commissioner Francis Wheat . . . resulted in the Wheat Report published in
1969 that recommended expanded periodic disclosure under the Exchange Act and coordination
of the Securities Act and Exchange Act disclosure requirements.‖).
54 Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10 U.
PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339, 365 (2008).
55 See Stephen J. Crimmins, Investor Protection Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 11, 2010, 12:11 PM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/11/investor-protection-provisions-of-the-doddfrank-act/ (noting
that the Dodd-Frank Act directs the SEC to study ―the level of financial literacy of retail
investors, and what means might be most effective to further educate them‖).
56 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the
Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (2009).
57 Id. at 1025–26.
58 Id. at 1026.
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12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM

156

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

investment prospects and has the ability to understand what the
research reveals.‖59
In response to this quandary, I have written previously that
―[p]erhaps the best view, then, is that the term ‗reasonable investor‘ is
meant simply to make the standard an objective one, excluding
idiosyncratic investing decisions, rather than favoring a particular
level of sophistication.‖60 This should not come as any surprise given
my repeated criticism of the various materiality safety valves
described herein. As Joan MacLeod Heminway has pointed out, ―[a]
conception of the reasonable investor as sophisticated is the root of
several key common law defenses to claims of materiality (‗mere
puffery,‘ ‗truth-on-the-market,‘ and ‗bespeaks caution‘).‖61 Somewhat
relatedly, David Hoffman has pointed out that to equate the
reasonable investor with ―homo economicus‖ (my words, not his) for
purposes of materiality determinations under Rule 10b-5 is to impose
a ―duty‖ to be a rational shareholder—a duty that is ―novel in scope‖
and ―ungrounded in principle.‖62 Accordingly, I have also proposed
elsewhere that if the materiality test really is intended to turn on the
reactions of reasonable investors, then perhaps we should ask them
directly what they deem material rather than engage in debate.63
Heminway, supra note 51, at 301.
Padfield, supra note 54, at 345–46. An idea I have been toying with lately is the
possibility of a ―target-group‖ standard. Cf. 3 HAZEN, supra note 20, at § 12.9[3][A] (―When a
defendant targets unreasonably naive or careless investors, the more objective reasonable person
standard will not preclude a finding of materiality.‖). See generally John M. Newman, Jr. et al.,
Basic Truths: The Implications of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory for Evaluating the
―Misleading‖ and ―Materiality‖ Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 20 J. CORP. L. 571, 572
(1995) (arguing that the ―reasonable investor‖ should be replaced by the ―professional investor‖
for purposes of determining materiality in fraud-on-the-market claims because those are the
investors that impact efficient market prices). I believe such a standard would differ from
Margaret Sachs‘s ―least sophisticated‖ standard in that it would allow for a ―highly
sophisticated‖ standard in connection with appropriate transactions. See Margaret V. Sachs,
Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing ―the Reasonable Investor‖ with ―the
Least Sophisticated Investor‖ in Inefficient Markets, 81 TUL. L. REV. 473 (2007) (arguing for
the adoption of a lower materiality standard in inefficient markets, which could be
counterbalanced by the adoption of a higher scienter standard).
61 Heminway, supra note 51, at 302.
62 Hoffman, supra note 45, at 538 (―Courts require investors to investigate their
purchases, to coldly process risk, to disregard oral statements of optimism, and in general to be
economically rational. If investors fail to meet these expectations, judges deny them the
protection of the securities laws. In this way, courts impose on public securities investors a
special kind of legal duty, novel in scope and, I will argue, ungrounded in principle.‖).
63 See Padfield, supra note 54, at 362–63 (―The legislative and judicial developments of
federal securities laws and regulations are similar to those of Lanham Act false advertising
law. . . . The significance of this relationship for our purposes is that it begs the question of why
survey evidence is an accepted part of the evidentiary makeup of a Lanham Act case,
particularly as to the issue of materiality, but not securities regulation cases.‖); cf. Crimmins,
supra note 55 (―The SEC will be able to engage in ‗investor testing programs‘ and other
initiatives to gather information from investors [under the Dodd-Frank Act].‖).
59
60
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So what is the point of all this? Well, if one perceives the courts‘
materiality determinations to be unduly restricting the definition of
―reasonable investor‖ in this context, then a shift of focus onto other
elements of Rule 10b-5 to dismiss frivolous suits may be appropriate.
Even if one is unsure as to the proper definition of the reasonable
investor for these purposes, the conclusion is the same if one prefers
that legislatures and administrative bodies with relevant expertise
define this sort of concept rather than courts. Only if one agrees with
a narrow definition of the reasonable investor and believes judges are
the proper dispensers of that judgment, should one support the court‘s
continued routine dependence on materiality as grounds for dismissal.
But even then, I will argue further that there are other good reasons
why one might nevertheless want judges to avoid depending on
materiality to dismiss frivolous suits if at all possible.
D. The Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption and ―Frivolous‖
Litigation as the Greatest Threat to Our Economy
In Basic, the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market
presumption of reliance and unleashed, at least according to much of
the business community, a flood of unmeritorious securities litigation.
This litigation was premised on the notion that the potential for
catastrophic damages generated by the large classes of plaintiffs now
capable of being formed would force companies to settle cases rather
than risk their assets at trial.64 These concerns continue to this day,
and recent legislative responses include enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 199565 (the ―PSLRA‖) and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 199866 (the
―SLUSA‖). The PSLRA imposed higher procedural hurdles on filing
for federal securities fraud class actions than existed for any other
type of private litigation.67 Meanwhile, the SLUSA ―significantly
limit[ed] the ability of plaintiff-investors to seek redress for securities
fraud under state law and through the state courts.‖68 I will spend

64 See, e.g., Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under the Radar,
2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 809 (2009) (―As a result of the Basic
presumption . . . securities fraud class actions increased in number.‖).
65 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 and 18 U.S.C.).
66 Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified primarily in 15 U.S.C. § 77p and
18 U.S.C. § 78bb).
67 See Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141, 144–48 (1999) (discussing how the PSLRA
changed the pleading standards for scienter and fraud).
68 Id. at 142.
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more time fleshing out the heightened pleading standards of the
PSLRA later in this Article.69
The legitimacy of all the wailing and gnashing of teeth regarding
frivolous litigation is hotly debated.70 Donald Langevoort has
commented, ―[a]s the noted securities law scholar Joel Seligman
pointed out at the time and subsequent research seems to have
confirmed, there probably is a stronger correlation between the merits
and both the filing and settlement of these actions than critics have
claimed.‖71 Meanwhile, Barbara Black has argued, ―the post-PSLRA
securities fraud class action is reasonably effective in achieving both
compensatory and deterrence goals.‖72 Regardless of what one may
think of the merits of the various arguments surrounding frivolous
securities litigation post-Basic, it would be difficult to deny that
judges and courts jumped into the fray feet first, and their favorite
tool for combating frivolous suits was often materiality.
E. The Evolution of Materiality ―Safety Valves‖
Professors Bainbridge and Gulati have said the following about
what I call ―safety valves‖ and they have called judicial ―rules of
thumb,‖ that is ―decisionmaking heuristics or shortcuts‖:
[T]he heuristics we identify are substantive law doctrinal
rules of thumb enabling a judge to avoid analysis of a case‘s
full complexities. . . . [They] not only become doctrine but
can come to dominate the ongoing evolution of substantive
law. . . . [T]he real puzzle is that federal judges are
See discussion infra Part IV.E.
See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Overturning Stoneridge and the Symbolic Passing of an Era,
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Aug 14, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/
shareholder-rights/overturning-stoneridge-and-the-symbolic-passing-of-an-era.html (―In the last
years of the Bush administration, the growing tenor was that securities litigation was harming
markets in the United States. Superficial analysis asserted that litigation was responsible for any
number of ills, including the decline in foreign listings on the NYSE. It was never a particularly
well reasoned approach (which is not to say that there are not problems with litigation that ought
to be addressed) and was often tendentious in its call for reforms.‖ (omitted emphasis in
original)).
71 Langevoort, supra note 11, at 155 (citing Joel Seligman, The Merits Do Matter: A
Comment on Professor Grundfest’s ―Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal
Securities Laws: The Commission’s Authority,‖ 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 444–49 (1994)). See
generally Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465,
1466 (2004) (discussing ―the American experience with securities class actions‖). But see
Langevoort, supra note 11, at 155 (―Even if we agree that a large percentage of fraud-on-themarket suits are based on at least plausible suspicions rather than imaginary factual claims,
however, there is another cause for concern: the possibility that issuer damage liability may be
disproportionate to the underlying conduct, particularly in a setting in which liability standards
are severely indeterminate.‖).
72 Black, supra note 64, at 806.
69
70
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claiming—at least implicitly—a level of expertise about the
workings of markets and organizations that, in some areas,
not even the most sophisticated researchers in financial
economics and organizational theory have reached.73
Before engaging in a discussion of the particular materiality safety
valves, I want to pause here to address the notion that judges and
courts should have more freedom to practice policymaking from the
bench in private actions arising under Rule 10b-5, than in other
settings, because the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 is
judicially implied. Indeed, and as quoted above, Justice Rehnquist
famously described the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 as ―a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn.‖74 A.C. Pritchard has noted that Justice Powell ―considered the
judge-made remedy under Rule 10b-5 to be a species of federal
common law, and thus appropriate for judges to consider policy in
defining its limits.‖75
On the other hand, Donald Langevoort has noted that the Supreme
Court rejected precisely such a policy-driven analysis of materiality in
Basic:
A more serious policy—the one that [Judge] Easterbrook had
emphasized—was the need to preserve some zone of secrecy
for merger negotiations that generally work to benefit
investors. But the Court asked what this had to do with
materiality. Materiality is not supposed to carry the baggage
of policy design but simply ask about the significance of what
is misrepresented or concealed.76
I would simply submit that even if judges and courts have some
greater freedom to make policy from the bench in private actions
arising under Rule 10b-5 than in other contexts, then let them say that
is what they are doing—rather than hiding behind interpretations of

Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 45, at 83–84.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
75 A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal
Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 865 (2003).
76 Donald C. Langevoort, Investor Protection and the Perils of Corporate Publicity: Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 257, 263 (Jonathan R. Macey ed.,
2008); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234–35 (―[T]he importance of secrecy
during the early stages of merger discussions, also seems irrelevant to an assessment whether
their existence is significant to the trading decision of a reasonable investor. . . . The ‗secrecy‘
rationale is simply inapposite to the definition of materiality.‖).
73
74
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materiality that at times sound like they sprang from the lips of
Humpty Dumpty.77
Thus, allow me to expressly state what I hope is the obvious theme
running through this Article: While there may have been a time when
it was appropriate to rely on materiality as a safety valve to prevent
the excess buildup of frivolous litigation, that time has passed. We
now have better alternatives that allow us to continue our vigilance
against strike suits without doing the damage we have arguably done
previously to the concept of materiality specifically and, in the
process, investor confidence generally. In that vein, I believe it
appropriate to revive a quote from former SEC Chairman Manuel F.
Cohen, which—while issued over forty years ago—rings particularly
true in this context: ―[W]e cannot always rely on past solutions as we
approach current or developing problems. Nor can we assume that
methods which were entirely proper, even praiseworthy, at an earlier
time are necessarily beneficial in a changed environment.‖78
At the same time, I do not mean to suggest that the other elements
of Rule 10b-5 do not suffer from their own doctrinal controversies. In
fact, I am quite likely to critique the application of those other
elements in future writing projects, and I try to point out at least some
of the issues surrounding those other elements in this Article. Nor am
I to be understood to be urging abdication of the responsibility of
courts to clean up the materiality doctrine ―mess‖ I describe herein.
Rather, what I am saying is that there should be enough cases where
dismissal on the basis of failure to satisfy some other element of Rule
10b-5 rather than materiality, like scienter, would be much less
controversial, and do much less harm in terms of investor trust and
confidence, than continuing to stretch the definition of materiality.
This is particularly so where courts are tempted, for whatever reason,
to dismiss cases on the basis of both materiality and some other
element of Rule 10b-5.
I will now provide a brief overview of the various materiality
safety-valve doctrines, followed by a discussion of why these
doctrines are problematic and courts no longer need to depend on
them.

77 See LEWIS C ARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
66 (1983) (―‗When I use a word,‘ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, ‗it means just
what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.‘‖).
78 Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm‘n, Address Before the
Investment Bankers Association of America (Nov. 30, 1965), quoted in Milton H. Cohen,
―Truth in Securities‖ Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1340 (1966).
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1. Puffery
The puffery doctrine can be found in a variety of areas of the law,
including: mail fraud, securities fraud, common-law fraud, legal
ethics, common-law contracts, Uniform Commercial Code warranty
cases, promissory misrepresentation, [and] false advertising.79 It
generally seeks to protect sellers from liability for mere ―sales talk.‖80
As early as 1887, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts asserted that
―[t]he law recognizes the fact that men will naturally overstate the
value and qualities of the articles which they have to sell. All men
know this, and a buyer has no right to rely upon such statements.‖81
An example of use of the puffery doctrine in the securities
litigation context can be found in the 2006 Seventh Circuit opinion in
the case of Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc.82 In Tellabs,
the court used the doctrine to immunize managerial statements
asserting that product demand was ―exceeding [their] expectations‖
and the company felt ―very, very good about the robust growth [it
was] experiencing.‖83 The court concluded: ―[t]his is precisely the
type of statement that the marketplace views as pure hype, and
accordingly discounts entirely,‖ and dismissed the claims. 84 However,
in an informal survey, sixty-two percent of investors found that the
first statement was material and thirty-three percent found that the
second statement was material.85 It is important to note, in reflecting
on these numbers, that when a court dismisses a case based on
immateriality, it is effectively saying that it has concluded, as a matter
of law, that zero percent of reasonable investors would consider the
statement material.86

79 David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1396–97
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
80 Jennifer O‘Hare, The Resurrection of the Dodo: The Unfortunate Re-emergence of the
Puffery Defense in Private Securities Fraud Actions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1697, 1698 (1998); see
also Hoffman, supra note 79, at 1441–42 (describing the ―puffery paradox,‖ as one where
―[s]ellers increasingly rely on persuasive, puffing, speech, but are protected from liability
because such speech is assumed not to work‖).
81 Kimball v. Bangs, 11 N.E. 113, 114 (Mass. 1887).
82 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
83 Id. at 597 (internal quotations omitted).
84 Id. at 598 (citing In re Allaire Corp. Sec. Litig., 224 F. Supp. 2d 319, 331 (D. Mass.
2002)).
85 Padfield, supra note 54, at 368.
86 See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976) (―Only if the
established omissions are ‗so obviously important to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot
differ on the question of materiality‘ is the ultimate issue of materiality appropriately resolved
‗as a matter of law‘ by summary judgment.‖ (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d
1124, 1129–30 (4th Cir. 1970))).
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2. Bespeaks Caution and the PSLRA
―[U]nder the ‗bespeaks caution‘ doctrine, the presence of
meaningful cautionary language can preclude a finding that investors
were misled by projections or other forward-looking statements.‖87
The bespeaks-caution doctrine was codified in section 21E of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as part of the PSLRA.88 Of
particular relevance here, given the focus on the impropriety of
sanctioning ―immaterial lies,‖ is the fact that the legislative
formulation of the bespeaks-caution doctrine facially immunizes
knowingly false statements made with an intent to deceive.89
At least some courts have avoided this seemingly unpalatable
result by concluding that any cautionary language provided in such a
context could not be meaningful. For example, the district court in In
re Nash Finch Co.,90 concluded that ―cautionary language can not be
‗meaningful‘ when defendants know that the potential risks they have
identified have in fact already occurred, and that the positive
statements they are making are false.‖91 But, as other courts have
held, this conclusion is arguably contrary to the express terms of the
statute. For example, the court in In re Humana, Inc. Securities
Litigation,92 endorsed the literal reading of the statute when it held
that ―Plaintiffs‘ allegation that the Defendants had actual knowledge
of the internal control problems ‗does not save the claim because the

87 Stefan J. Padfield, Who Should Do the Math? Materiality Issues in Disclosures That
Require Investors to Calculate the Bottom Line, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 927, 935 (2007); see also In re
Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d Cir. 1993) (―[W]hen an offering
document‘s forecasts, opinions or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements, the forward-looking statements will not form the basis for a securities fraud claim if
those statements did not affect the ‗total mix‘ of information the document provided investors.
In other words, cautionary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or
misrepresentations immaterial as a matter of law.‖). But see Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604
F.3d 758, 772 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the defendant‘s statement that ―potential
deterioration in the high-yield sector . . . could result in further losses in AEFA‘s portfolio‖ was
too vague to constitute meaningful cautionary language) (alteration in original).
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (setting forth the requirement that the
forward-looking statement be ―accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements‖ in order to
receive the protections of the safe harbor); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2006) (codifying a
parallel provision under the Securities Act of 1933).
89 Cf. Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements:
An Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge or Falsity Precludes the Meaningful Cautionary
Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519, 520 (2010) (―[A]ctual knowledge of the weaknesses in a
projection, including lack of a good faith belief in the projection, is not relevant to reliance on
the meaningful cautionary statement safe harbor.‖).
90 502 F. Supp. 2d 861 (D. Minn. 2007).
91 Id. at 873; see also Asher v. Baxter Int‘l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 734 (7th Cir. 2004)
(explaining that cautionary language would not be effective if the issuer intentionally omitted
important risk factors).
92 No. 3:08CV-00162-JHM, 2009 WL 1767193 (W.D. Ky. June 23, 2009).

12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM

2010]

IMMATERIAL LIES

163

existence of the meaningful cautionary statement renders the issuer‘s
state of mind irrelevant.‘‖93
3. Truth on the Market and the Simple-Math Rule
The truth-on-the-market defense has its roots in the ―total mix‖
definition of materiality. As Peter Huang describes it, ―the truth-onthe-market defense argues that an issuer‘s statements or omissions
cannot be misleading if there already is countervailing information,
such as analysts‘ reports, in the public domain that is therefore part of
the ‗total mix‘ of information that is available.‖94 This defense has
particular relevance to ongoing subprime-crisis litigation. One of the
primary arguments of defendants in these cases is that either (1) no
one knew there was a problem until it was too late, or (2) to the extent
people knew there was a problem, that information was public
knowledge and so a particular defendant‘s failure to disclose this
information was immaterial.
This approach has already reaped dividends. For example, the
court in Landmen Partners Inc. v. Blackstone Group, L.P.,95
concluded that ―to the extent that Plaintiff alleges Blackstone should
have disclosed the conditions of the [real estate] market generally,
such omissions are not actionable. ‗Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) do not
require the disclosure of publicly available information.‘‖96
Apparently, the fact that one of Blackstone‘s four business segments
was real estate and described itself on March 22, 2007, as seeing
―‗high levels of growth‘ in the real estate industry and ‗strong
investor demand for real estate assets‘‖97 was not a problem because,
for example, home builder DR Horton had publicly announced on
March 8 that 2007 ―is going to suck.‖98 One can certainly wonder
whether issuer statements do not take on even more materiality when
they come at a time of market uncertainty.99
A variant of the truth-on-the-market doctrine that I have written
about previously is what I call the ―simple math‖ rule.100 The simple93 Id. at *15 (quoting Beaver Cnty. Ret. Bd. v. LCA-Vision Inc., No. 1:07-CV-750, 2009
WL 806714, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 25, 2009)).
94 Peter H. Huang, Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of
Information and the Reasonableness of Investor, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99. 118 (2005).
95 659 F. Supp. 2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
96 Id. at 545 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F.
Supp. 2d 243, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
97 Id. at 538 (quoting Consol. Am. Class Action Compl. ¶ 88).
98 Bleak Housing Outlook for US Firm, BBC N EWS (Mar. 8, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/business/6429815.stm.
99 Cf. C ASSIDY , supra note 27, at 18 (describing battle of experts regarding subprime
risks in buildup to crisis).
100 See Padfield, supra note 87, at 928 (defining the simple-math rule); cf. Hoffman, supra
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math rule states that even if an issuer has not disclosed a particular
fact, that omission will be deemed immaterial if the information
necessary to deduce that fact has been disclosed. In other words,
―[t]he courts have generally agreed that readers can put two and two
together, and make somewhat more elaborate calculations or
comparisons.‖101 A negative correlate of the simple-math rule is the
―buried-facts‖ doctrine, which states, ―a disclosure is deemed
inadequate if it is presented in a way that conceals or obscures the
information sought to be disclosed.‖102 For example, ―[t]he doctrine
applies when the fact in question is hidden in a voluminous document
or is disclosed in a piecemeal fashion which prevents a reasonable
shareholder from realizing the ‗correlation and overall import of the
various facts interspersed throughout‘ the document.‖103 As I noted in
an earlier piece, not all applications of the simple-math rule leave one
convinced that ―material omission‖ has a common understanding:
Werner v. Werner . . . held that failure to disclose the
magnitude of the gain flowing to interested directors in
connection with a transaction they were recommending to
shareholders was immaterial because shareholders could
calculate that magnitude by: (1) recognizing that a planned
removal of a right of first refusal under an equity incentive
plan, as set forth in the relevant 1997 proxy statement, would
benefit management; (2) then looking ―to the 1993 and 1994
annual reports to determine how many shares were issued
each year pursuant to the Restricted Stock Plan‖; (3) then
using those same reports to ―determine the approximate fair
market value (‗FMV‘) of Restricted shares at the date of
issuance‖; (4) then employing the equation ―[(FMV 1997FMV in 1993) x number of shares issued in 1993] + [(FMV
1997- FMV 1994) x number of shares issued in 1994]‖ in
order to ―compute the amount of money the management
defendants would have gotten for their shares had the right of
first refusal been exercised‖; and then finally, (5) comparing
―the amount yielded by the above equation to the $66 million

note 45, at 581–82 (describing the truth-the-on-market doctrine as the ―‗understand
consequences‘ technique‖).
101 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, 2 Bromberg & LOWENFELS ON
SECURITIES FRAUD & C OMMODITIES FRAUD § 5:237 (2d ed. 2010).
102 Werner v. Werner, 267 F.3d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2001).
103 Id. (quoting Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796 F.2d 508, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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the management defendants would actually receive in the
Recapitalization as proposed.‖104
I noted in conclusion that ―[a]t least some would agree that this
labyrinth-like disclosure of a material fact is not consistent with a
philosophy of full and fair disclosure.‖105
4. Bright-Line Price-Movement Rules
Finally, some courts espouse the view that ―[b]ecause in an
efficient market ‗the concept of materiality translates into information
that alters the price of the firm‘s stock,‘ if a company‘s disclosure of
information has no effect on stock prices, ‗it follows that the
information disclosed . . . was immaterial as a matter of law.‘‖106
Other courts, while recognizing that stock price movement may be a
strong indicator of materiality, do not limit themselves in this way. 107
For example, the court in Reiss v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc.,108 held that ―hindsight is of limited value and the fact that
ultimate disclosure of the [information] affected [the] stock price is
not compelling.‖109
III. THE PROBLEM OF OVERDEPENDENCE ON MATERIALITY
Having laid the foundation for a deeper discussion of the problems
created by an overdependence on materiality as a judicial safety valve
for frivolous suits, we turn now to a discussion of those problems.
The three primary arguments are that (1) when courts dismiss on
materiality grounds they are immunizing lying; (2) the materiality
safety valves are in conflict with the purposes of our securities
regulation regime and Supreme Court precedence; and, (3) excessive
characterization of disclosures as immaterial creates conflicts with the
SEC‘s disclosure regime.

104 Padfield, supra note 87, at 943–44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Werner, 267 F.3d at
299–300).
105 Id. at 944 (footnote omitted). It is also arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court‘s
admonition that ―not every mixture with the true will neutralize the deceptive.‖ Va. Bankshares,
Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991).
106 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d. 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000) (omission in original) (quoting In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997)).
107 See, e.g., No. 84 Emp‘r-Teamster Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding
Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 935 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the plaintiff sufficiently pled
materiality even where the relevant disclosure had no immediate effect on stock price).
108 711 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983).
109 Id. at 13.
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A. When Courts Dismiss on Materiality Grounds
They Are Immunizing Lies
Should management be free to lie to investors with the intent to
deceive them?110 Every time a court dismisses a Rule 10b-5 claim for
lack of materiality, it is effectively answering that question in the
affirmative. This is so because materiality is a necessary element of a
Rule 10b-5 claim and its absence thus destroys the claim regardless of
a plaintiff‘s ability to carry his or her burden on the other elements. In
fact, one could argue that in order for dismissal on the basis of
immateriality to have any real meaning the court must assume the
other elements—like falsity and intent to deceive—are satisfied when
reaching its conclusion. This practice alone should reduce the
frequency of dismissals based on immateriality because assuming the
matter is important enough for management to lie about inherently
suggests materiality.111 As the Supreme Court has noted in a related
context:
Shareholders know that directors usually have knowledge and
expertness far exceeding the normal investor‘s resources, and
the directors‘ perceived superiority is magnified even further
by the common knowledge that state law customarily obliges
them to exercise their judgment in the shareholders‘ interest.
Naturally, then, the shareowner faced with a proxy request
will think it important to know the directors‘ beliefs about the
course they recommend and their specific reasons for urging
the stockholders to embrace it.112
Indeed, some courts in the past have suggested, ―any false
statement or omission by company management, if intentional, should
be considered material because it reveals a lack of management
integrity that is presumably important to investors.‖113 But the general
110 Cf. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10–11 (Del. 1998) (―The directors‘ fiduciary duties
include the duty to deal with their stockholders honestly. Shareholders are entitled to rely upon
the truthfulness of all information disseminated to them by the directors they elect to manage the
corporate enterprise.‖).
111 See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968) (―[A] major factor
in determining whether . . . [there is] a material fact is the importance attached to . . . [it] by
those who knew about it.‖).
112 Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1091 (citation omitted).
113 Sauer, supra note 30, at 332; see also Gebhardt v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824,
829–30 (8th Cir. 2003); Talma Trust v. Molex, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 960, 979 (N.D. Ill. 2006);
cf. Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L. 169, 172, 175
(2009) (asking whether investors can ―recover damages resulting from declines in the stock
price attributable to the market‘s reassessment of the integrity of management‖ and concluding
that ―there is no basis in law or policy for denying plaintiffs recovery for reputational
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rule, as stated by the Supreme Court, is that: ―It is not enough that a
statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is
otherwise insignificant.‖114 Nonetheless, the concept of immunizing
lies, particularly on the part of corporate management, raises
troubling issues in these difficult times.
Trust is a critical, if not the critical, ingredient to the success
of the capital markets (and of the free market economy in
general). . . . From the inception of federal securities
legislation in the 1930s, to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
to the policies under consideration in Washington, D.C.,
today, it has long been understood that in the face of
economic calamity, the restoration and/or preservation of
trust—especially investor trust—in our financial institutions
and markets has been paramount.
And if further proof of the indispensability of trust was
needed, it has been forcefully provided by the financial
services industry crisis and the unusually strong recession
currently afflicting much of the globe throughout 2008–2009.
By most accounts, a breach of trust—in the form of fairly
reckless risk-taking by some, and in the form of dereliction of
duty by others—has precipitated the crisis and, indirectly, the
recession. And the lack of trust that these breaches
engendered has figured prominently in the persistence of our
economic woes (from banks fearful of lending, to investors
fleeing the capital markets).115

damages‖). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics:
An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN . L. R EV . 1059, 1091 (1990)
(―[M]anagement should be allowed to deny rumors which it knows to be correct and even to
make affirmative misstatements if doing so is necessary to protect aggregate share value.‖).
114 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238; see also Greenhouse v. MCG Capital Corp.,
392 F.3d 650, 660 (4th Cir. 2004) (―[N]ot all lies are actionable; the securities laws are only
concerned with lies about material facts.‖).
115 Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and Financial Regulation, 55 V ILL. L. R EV . (forthcoming
2010) (manuscript at 3) (footnotes omitted), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1481327; see
also Lynn A. Stout, Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets 1 (UCLA
Sch. of Law Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-15, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442023 (―[M]any investors rely on trust. Indeed, trust may be
essential to a well-developed securities market. . . . When trust is not met by trustworthiness but
instead is abused, trust tends to disappear. These lessons carry significant implications for our
understanding of modern securities markets.‖); cf. Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency:
Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U.
L. R EV. 115, 115 (2009) (―Consumers and investors simply cannot trust the existing disclosure
regime to provide reliable information necessary to monitor CSR [Corporate Social
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In light of this, we may rightly be concerned when our courts
routinely immunize lying in the name of securities regulation.116 As
Donald Langevoort has said, the Supreme Court in Basic ―was not
persuaded . . . that making life easier for lawyers or business people
was as important a value as the pursuit of truth.‖117
Ultimately, my argument here is tempered by the fact that I am not
trying to convince judges deciding a Rule 10b-5 claim never to
dismiss on the basis of immateriality, but rather to consider the
implications of such a dismissal fully and rely on other grounds where
sufficient, so as to avoid the problems I describe herein.118
B. The ―Safety Valve‖ Materiality Doctrines Are in Conflict
with the Purposes of Our Securities Regulation Regime
and Supreme Court Guidance
As discussed above, the primary ―safety valves‖ involving
materiality include the puffery, bespeaks-caution, truth-on-themarket, and price-movement doctrines. This subsection will first
examine problems associated with the puffery doctrine in detail,
followed by a shorter examination of problems associated with the
other three doctrines.
1. Puffery
There are numerous criticisms of the puffery doctrine. For
purposes of this Article, I have grouped these criticisms into four
―challenges.‖ First, the challenge presented by the findings of
behavioral economics, which demonstrate that individuals are more
susceptible to puffery than the doctrine asserts. Second, the challenge
presented by the fact that protection of puffery is firmly rooted in the

Responsibility] compliance. That lack of trust will cause the market for CSR to collapse, as
consumers and investors stop offering rewards for responsible business behavior.‖). But cf.
Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation (May 14, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1608115 (―[T]rust is
complicated, existing in a variety of forms. Some forms, predicated primarily upon reasoned
calculation, respond well to law and regulation. But other forms, predicated primarily upon
relationship and emotion, respond poorly to law and regulation.‖).
116 Cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create Moral Hazard?: When Judges Nullify
Employer Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 998, 1003 (2009) (―[J]udicial review can
serve as government insurance by relieving employers of liability for socially undesirable
conduct. . . . [C]ourts create moral hazard by vacating a high percentage of employee wins at
arbitration.‖).
117 Langevoort, supra note 76, at 269.
118 Cf. United States v. O‘Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (―[A]n animating purpose of
the Exchange Act[ is] to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence.‖).
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doctrine of caveat emptor—a doctrine expressly rejected by our
current system of securities regulation. Third, the challenge presented
by the fact that when statements are analyzed in isolation in order to
determine whether they constitute ―puffing,‖ the total-mix aspect of
the materiality definition is ignored. Finally, the challenge presented
by market realities. This last challenge is nicely summed up by David
Hoffman in his description of the ―unwholesome‖ puffery paradox,
whereby ―[s]ellers increasingly rely on persuasive, puffing, speech,
but are protected from liability because such speech is assumed not to
work.‖119
a) Behavioral Economics
Professor Langevoort has cogently asked: ―Is it clear that typical
investors do not rely on puffery? There is little research that studies
this specifically, and so many judges are guessing.‖120 In a previous
article, I tried to shed some light on this question by surveying a
group of investors to determine their responses to statements deemed
immaterial puffery by courts.121 The survey results showed that
―while the judges in the four surveyed cases concluded that no
reasonable investor could find the statements challenged therein to be
material because they constituted non-actionable puffery, between
33% and 84% of reasonable investors surveyed deemed the
statements material.‖122
These results are consistent with at least some of the findings of
behavioral economics.123 As Peter Huang has explained, ―[r]ecent
research in psychology and the neurosciences reveals that humans
comprehend and face risk utilizing two fundamental systems, one
analytic and the other experiential.‖124 Huang goes on to define what
he calls ―moody investing‖ as ―investing that is (at least, partially)
non-cognitive.‖125 He then concludes, ―[m]oody investing means that
the puffery defense is flawed because vague, promotional, or
119 Hoffman,

supra note 79, at 1441–42.
C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 184 (2002).
121 See Padfield, supra note 54, at 340–41.
122 Id. at 341.
123 See generally Hoffman, supra note 45, at 545–62 (reviewing the implications of
behavioral law and economics for materiality determinations in securities regulation cases).
124 Huang, supra note 94, at 102; see also Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as
Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311
(2004) (exploring the proper integration of the analytic and experimental systems in rational
decision making); Valerie F. Reyna, How People Make Decisions that Involve Risk: A DualProcess Approach, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 60 (2004) (describing a new
approach to dual-process reasoning, called the ―fuzzy-trace theory‖).
125 Huang, supra note 94, at 102–03.
120 Donald
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hyperbolic statements can have real impacts on moods and therefore
should not be deemed immaterial as a matter of law.‖126
Clearly, not everyone is jumping on the behavioral economics
bandwagon.127 Stephen Bainbridge notes that ―the relevant question to
ask about the assumptions of a theory is not whether they are
descriptively realistic, for they never are, but whether they are
sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand,‖ and ―[t]he
extent to which behavioral economics calls into question more
traditional modes of economic analysis remains sharply contested.‖128
Professor Bainbridge does acknowledge, however, that ―[a]t the very
least . . . it seems clear that attention must be paid to the possibility
that behavioral analysis sheds light on policy issues.‖129 Nonetheless,
Ivan Preston noted in 1998, ―no behavioral studies have reported the
finding, assumed by the law, that consumers typically see puffery or
other loophole claims as meaningless.‖130 I am not aware of any
studies having been conducted in the interim to seriously challenge
that conclusion.
b) The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
The historical basis of the puffery defense is rooted in the doctrine
of caveat emptor. As Richard J. Leighton describes it, ―[t]he puffing
defense is one of the few remaining vestiges, if not the only one, of
the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor (‗let the buyer beware‘).‖131
However, the doctrine of caveat emptor is diametrically opposed to
the doctrine of full and fair disclosure underlying our securities
regime. As the Supreme Court noted in SEC v. Capital Gains
126 Id.

at 115.
e.g., Darian Ibrahim, Rational Choice or Behavioral Law and Economics?, THE
CONGLOMERATE (Sep. 4, 2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/09/rational-choice-orbehavioral-law-and-economics.html (―The behavioral camp has much to offer. But several
observations made by others persuade me not to dip my toes too deep into the behavioral
waters.‖).
128 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure and Securities Regulation: A Behavioral
Analysis, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 29, 2010, 11:00 AM), http://www.professorbain
bridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2010/01/mandatory-disclosure-and-securities-regulation-abehavioral-analysis.html.
129 Id.
130 Ivan L. Preston, Puffery and Other ―Loophole‖ Claims: How the Law’s ―Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell‖ Policy Condones Fraudulent Falsity in Advertising, 18 J.L. & COM. 49, 82–83
(1998). Cf. id. at 81 (―Rotfeld & Rotzoll showed five ads containing 13 puffing claims to 100
subjects, who 80.5 percent of the time reported these claims to be conveyed to them. The same
research asked about 17 fact claims that might be implied by the puffery claims. While the law‘s
assumption, as with the Bruskin research, is that such perceptions do not occur, the subjects saw
the puff-implied fact claims conveyed 44.7 percent of the time.‖ (footnote omitted)).
131 Richard J. Leighton, Making Puffery Determinations in Lanham Act False Advertising
Cases: Surveys, Dictionaries, Judicial Edicts and Materiality Tests, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 615,
637 (2005).
127 See,
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Research Bureau, Inc.,132 ―[a] fundamental purpose, common to the
[‘33 and ‘34 Act], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for
the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard
of business ethics in the securities industry.‖133 In fact, Justice Powell
referred to puffery as one of the evils the ‘33 Act was intended to
address.134
Perhaps for these reasons, it was not too long ago that a leading
treatise declared that the puffery defense had ―all but gone the way of
the dodo.‖135 In addition to the inappropriateness of favoring a
doctrine rooted in caveat emptor, this apparent disappearance made
sense because the puffery defense was grounded on two additional
underlying assumptions rarely applicable in typical 10b-5 actions: (1)
―that the parties are on equal footing, with equal access to
information,‖ and (2) ―that the purchaser has no reason to trust a
seller‘s sales talk.‖136 However, the puffery defense has since made a
Phoenix-like return in spite of these concerns.137
c) Ignoring the Total Mix
Courts generally ignore context when applying the puffery
doctrine, contrary to the ―total mix‖ aspect of the definition of
materiality. For example, Jennifer O‘Hare has noted that in applying
the puffery defense in securities litigation ―courts have improperly
limited their focus to the words or language of the company‘s
statement, while ignoring such important factors as who made the
statement and where the statement was made.‖138 This is in stark
contrast to the bespeaks-caution doctrine139 (discussed in more detail
below), which immunizes otherwise material forward-looking
132 375

U.S. 180 (1963).
at 186.
134 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 759 n.4 (1975) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (―The evil addressed was the tendency of the seller to exaggerate, to ‗puff,‘ and
sometimes fraudulently to overstate the prospects and earning capabilities of the issuing
corporation.‖).
135 7 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3424 (3d ed. 1991).
136 O‘Hare, supra note 80, at 1705.
137 See 7 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 135, at 3424 (―[A]las, however, the puffing
concept in the securities context, which for decades had all but gone the way of the dodo, has
recently experienced a revival.‖ (footnote omitted)); O‘Hare, supra note 80, at 1698 (―More
recently . . . courts have extended the protections of the puffery defense to non-broker
defendants, such as corporate officers and directors.‖).
138 O‘Hare, supra note 80, at 1700 (emphasis in original); cf. Va. Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093 (1991) (―[C]onclusory terms in a commercial context are
reasonably understood to rest on a factual basis that justifies them as accurate, the absence of
which renders them misleading.‖), quoted in United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 553 (5th
Cir. 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010).
139 See discussion infra Parts II.E.2.
133 Id.
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misstatements by relying on the fact that they were presented in the
context of meaningful cautionary language. As Professors Bainbridge
and Gulati have noted: ―If putting the statement into context lends
credence to a decision to dismiss, the bespeaks caution doctrine is
invoked. If taking a statement out of context makes dismissal more
plausible, however, puffery is invoked.‖140
d) Contradicted by Market Realities
Finally, both experimental literature and the prevalence of puffery
in the marketplace belie the conclusion that puffery is immaterial. For
example, David Hoffman has noted, ―[e]xperimental literature
analyzing puffery confirms that individuals are unable to ignore
vague optimism and expressions of confidence.‖141 Meanwhile,
Professors Bainbridge and Gulati properly do not ignore the fact that
―[a]necdotally, it does not take much time watching investment
programs on television to notice that even quite vague statements of
optimism by corporate managers are considered important by the
investment news media.‖142 When ―a major factor in determining
whether information [is] material is the importance attached to it by
those who knew about it,‖ then the fact that those who market their
companies rely so much on puffery patently contradicts the assertion
that puffery is immaterial.143
Some have argued that puffery deserves to be protected because it
is shareholder-friendly. In other words, do shareholders really want
management to forego the sales talk?144 As the court in Eisenstadt v.
Centel Corp.145 noted: ―Where puffing is the order of the day, literal
truth can be profoundly misleading, as senders and recipients of
letters of recommendation well know.‖146 However, the Supreme
Court responded to similar concerns in Basic by concluding that
―creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a
prodisclosure legislative philosophy, because complying with the

140 Bainbridge

& Gulati, supra note 45, at 123.
supra note 45, at 587.
142 Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 45, at 120.
143 SEC v. Mayhew, 121 F.3d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1997).
144 See Larry Ribstein, The Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Prosecution: Spin or Fraud?,
IDEOBLOG (Oct. 12, 2009, 7:33 PM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/10/the-bearstearns-hedge-fund-prosecution-spin-or-fraud.html (―[I]mposing criminal liability for spin could
encourage misleadingly pessimistic disclosures that end up hurting rather than helping
investors.‖).
145 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 1997).
146 Id. at 746.
141 Hoffman,
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regulation might be ‗bad for business,‘ is a role for Congress, not this
Court.‖147
Having discussed a variety of the objections to the puffery
doctrine, I will now turn to the other three materiality safety valves I
have previously identified.
2. Bespeaks Caution: Contrary to the Admonition
Against Bright-Line Rules
The goal of thwarting frivolous litigation has been deemed to be so
lofty that under the express terms of the PSLRA a defendant could
rely on the codified bespeaks-caution doctrine even where the
plaintiff proved that the challenged statement ―was made with actual
knowledge . . . that the statement was false or misleading.‖148 As
mentioned above, the fact that this doctrine—at least as codified
under the PSLRA (and as interpreted by at least some courts)—can be
used to immunize knowingly false statements issued with the intent to
defraud seemingly makes a mockery of ―investor protection‖ under
the securities laws. Furthermore, the very concept of cautionary
statements making forward-looking statements immaterial is arguably
facially incoherent.149
Of course, one can argue that this is the price that investors must
pay in order to encourage corporations to issue the forward-looking
statements so valued by the market. And indeed, the history leading
up to codification of the bespeaks-caution doctrine suggests this is, at
least partly, the case.150 However, even if one accepts the need for
some type of safe-harbor provision in this area, the bespeaks-caution
doctrine as currently applied arguably functions very much like a
bright-line rule.151 At the very least, such an application of the
147 Basic

Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240 n.17 (1988).
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
149 See Hoffman, supra note 45, at 588 (―Courts assume that individuals can hear a source
saying two things—‗I express the following beliefs about the future‘ and ‗Don‘t rely on
anything I just said‘—and make a rational decision about which statement is worthy of
credence. This is nonsense.‖). See also Heminway, supra note 51, at 305 (―[T]he bespeaks
caution defense exists because a reasonable (sophisticated) investor would not find forwardlooking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary language (1) important to her
investment decision making or (2) significant to the total mix of available information.‖
(footnote omitted)).
150 See Jeanne Calderon & Rachel Kowal, Safe Harbors: Historical and Current
Approaches To Future Forecasting, 22 J. CORP. L. 661, 664–65 (1997) (noting that ―[i]n the
early 1970s, the SEC reversed its position prohibiting submission of forward-looking
information,‖ but that it soon saw the need to provide a safe harbor to encourage disclosure).
151 See Hoffman, supra note 45, at 586 (―Over time, as I have explored, courts have
become more willing to apply ‗puffery‘ and ‗bespeaks caution‘ doctrines which are (1) brightline rules that focus on the language of disclosures . . . .‖); id. at 588 (―Notably, both doctrines
create incentives for corporations to use words that they hope will induce reliance, but which
148 15
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doctrine runs counter to the Supreme Court‘s admonition that brightline rules are an anathema to the fact-intensive analysis of
materiality.152
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore alternative
formulations of the bespeaks-caution doctrine that might run less
afoul of the Supreme Court‘s rejection of bright-line rules, or be less
objectionable in terms of immunizing deceit. It is, however, very
much within the scope of this Article to suggest that such concerns
support relying on some other ground (e.g., scienter) to dismiss
unmeritorious suits whenever possible.
3. Truth-on-the-Market: The Misplaced Materiality Defense
The truth-on-the-market doctrine is primarily a doctrine designed
to allow a defendant to rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance. As the Supreme Court noted in Basic, proving that the
market makers ―were privy to the truth‖ may rebut the ―presumption
of reliance‖ in a fraud-on-the-market case.153 Nonetheless, some
courts have also used it to find alleged misstatements immaterial as a
matter of law. For example, the Second Circuit, in Ganino v. Citizens
Utilities Co.,154 opined, ―Under this [truth-on-the-market] corollary, a
misrepresentation is immaterial if the information is already known to
the market because the misrepresentation cannot then defraud the
market.‖155
When so utilized, the truth-on-the-market doctrine, like the
bespeaks-caution doctrine, has its roots in the total-mix definition of
materiality.156 For example, in In re Merck & Co., Securities
Litigation,157 the Third Circuit held that failure to disclose the bottomline impact of financial misstatements was immaterial as a matter of
law where the data to calculate the bottom was disclosed to

may be rendered legally irrelevant; they are bright-line rules that enable fraud.‖).
152 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (noting that while the bright-line rule ―seems to be directed
solely at the comfort of corporate managers . . . ease of application alone is not an excuse for
ignoring the purposes of the Securities Acts‖); id. (―Any approach that designates a single fact
or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality,
must necessarily be overinclusive or underinclusive.‖).
153 Id. at 248.
154 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
155 Id. at 167 (citing Provenz v. Miller, 102 F.3d 1478, 1492 (9th Cir. 1996); Associated
Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d 208, 213–14 (7th Cir.
1993)).
156 See Padfield, supra note 87, at 934 (―[U]nder the total mix of information analysis,
public availability of the truth may offset a misleading disclosure.‖).
157 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005).
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investors.158 The court, however, noted the interplay of materiality
and fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, which is only
available in the case of efficient markets: ―If these analysts—all
focused on revenue—were unable for two months to make a handful
of calculations, how can we presume an efficient market at all?‖159
Given the problem of overdependence on materiality discussed in this
Article, hopefully the courts will keep the truth-on-the-market
doctrine where it belongs—in their analysis of reliance.160 Of course,
dismissing a case for lack of reliance does not completely solve the
―condoning deceit‖ problem because the court could still be
dismissing an action where plaintiff has proven a misstatement of
material fact made with intent to deceive.161 Nonetheless, I submit
that telling plaintiffs that they did not rely on materially misleading
statements arguably negatively impacts investor trust in the market
less than telling them they were unreasonable for considering
managerial statements important.162
4. Bright-Line Price Movement
Finally, courts that have the ―‗clearest commitments‘‖163 to the
efficient-market hypothesis have often extended that hypothesis to
conclude that ―the materiality of disclosed information may be
measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in the period
immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm‘s stock.‖ 164
This bright-line price-movement rule is also not without its critics. To
begin with, as noted above, the Supreme Court specifically cautioned
158 Id. at 270–71. See generally Padfield, supra note 87, at 928–29 (arguing that the
―Simple Math‖ rule applied in Merck should be replaced by a ―Reasonably Available Data‖
rule).
159 In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 270.
160 Cf. Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 415 (5th Cir. 2001) (―While we agree
with Burlington and the district court as to the requirement, in cases depending on the fraud-onthe-market theory, that the complained of misrepresentation or omission have actually affected
the market price of the stock, we conclude that it is more appropriate in such cases to relate this
requirement to reliance rather than to materiality. That is how both Basic and Abell approach the
matter.‖).
161 Cf. Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to
Defraud Buyers of Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and
Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 309, 334 (2010) (―The poor reasoning by the
Stoneridge majority—that fraud calculated to mislead the certifying accountants was too remote
to meet § 10(b)‘s reliance requirement—appears to be driven by the eagerness to create what the
majority incorrectly perceives as a ‗pro-business‘ rule to discourage litigation.‖).
162 The same may be said of some of the other alternative grounds for dismissal suggested
below, such as loss causation.
163 In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 269 (quoting Nathaniel Carden, Comment, Implications of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of Market Efficiency,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 886 (1998)).
164 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2000).
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against the use of bright-line rules in making materiality
determinations when it stated, ―[a]ny approach that designates a
single fact or occurrence as always determinative of an inherently
fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be
overinclusive or underinclusive.‖165 As I noted in an earlier article,
allegiance to this bright-line price-movement rule led the Third
Circuit to effectively conclude that ―an article appearing on the front
page of the [Wall Street] Journal‘s ‗Money & Investing‘ section (in
the popular ‗Heard on the Street‘ column) was not news,‖166 because
the disclosed information had been disseminated earlier and the
relevant stock price did not move (though it did in response to the
Journal‘s article).167
The bright-line price-movement test of materiality also relies
heavily on event studies. As James Park describes:
In securities class actions, litigants often rely upon event
studies in arguing whether a misstatement is material. An
event study measures the stock market‘s reaction to a piece of
news by comparing the change in a company‘s stock price
with its average return or the market‘s average return over a
time period. To the extent that the company‘s stock price
diverges from normal market movements in a statistically
significant way, there is an abnormal return that can be
attributed to the tested event.168
However, these event studies are themselves the subject of much
criticism. At least one study has concluded that ―the standard
approach is plagued by systematic, downward bias . . . . As an
empirical matter, then, use of the standard approach can be expected
to lead to substantial anti-plaintiff bias in securities litigation . . . .‖169
Furthermore, evidence of market price reaction may be delayed in
ways that make overdependence on price movement suspect for
purposes of determining materiality.170 It is this problem of ―noise‖
165 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988); see also No. 84 Emp‘r-Teamster
Joint Council Pension Trust Fund v. Am. W. Holding Corp., 320 F.3d 920, 934 (9th Cir. 2003)
(―Pursuant to Basic, we reject Defendants‘ argument for adoption of a bright-line rule requiring
an immediate market reaction. The market is subject to distortions that prevent the ideal of ‗a
free and open public market‘ from occurring.‖ (quoting Basic, 485 U.S. at 246)).
166 Padfield, supra note 87, at 957.
167 See id. (discussing In re Merck, 432 F.3d at 270).
168 James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L.
513, 533 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
169 Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies
(Claremont McKenna Coll., Robert Day Sch. of Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 2009-17,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442222.
170 See Sauer, supra note 30, at 324 (―Exposure of a company‘s accounting woes, for
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surrounding stock price movement that limits the argument that if
there is no impact on the price of a security, then there are no
damages.171
One scholar has even argued the growing dependence on event
studies in securities fraud suits could constitute a violation of the
Seventh Amendment:
The interrelated questions of materiality, reliance, loss
causation, and damages all require an event study for their
resolution. . . . As such, a defrauded investor who fails to
offer a reliable event study performed by a qualified expert
has little chance of prevailing. The dispositive role now
played by event studies, however, is inconsistent with the
Seventh Amendment and the federal securities laws. Rather,
an event study requirement poses an unconstitutional and
unwarranted barrier to meritorious securities fraud suits.172
Finally, overdependence on stock price movement may also
incentivize insiders to disclose information to the market in a way that
minimizes their risk of liability at the expense of market efficiency. 173
In this age of fragile investor trust, courts should be very hesitant to
encourage this kind of behavior.
Having discussed various doctrinal, as well as practical, problems
associated with the materiality safety valves, I turn now to the issue of
conflict with the SEC‘s disclosure rules.

example, may not occur until after it has been acquired by another company and its stock is no
longer publicly traded. Or fraud may occur in connection with the sale of a security for which
there is no public market. More commonly, market data is available in some form but is difficult
to interpret. Further, by the time information is disclosed by an issuer, it may have leaked into
the market from another source, or subsequent events may have rendered it stale and therefore
unimportant to investors.‖).
171 Cf. 3 HAZEN, supra note 20 § 12.9[3][C] (―Although the absence of an impact on the
market price certainly will make it more difficult to prove materiality, it should not be an
absolute bar to a finding of materiality.‖).
172 Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive
Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 187 (2009);
cf. John M. Wunderlich, Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 613, 672 (2008) (―Along with the Court‘s desire to curb excessive discovery in
securities litigation, the Court also sought to assuage concerns about the pleading standard‘s
impact on the Seventh Amendment.‖).
173 See Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs’
Attorneys Review the Supreme Court’s Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation,
37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2005) (―[S]ecurities-fraud perpetrators could just as easily ‗walk
down‘ the stock price by the selective disclosure of seemingly unrelated ‗bad‘ news concerning
the company and thereby avoid a sudden stock-price reaction, and insulate themselves from
liability.‖).

12/30/2010 2:28:03 PM

178

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

C. Excessive Characterization of Disclosures as Immaterial
Creates Conflicts with Disclosure Regime
The disclosure requirements under our securities laws have been
described as involving ―a delicate and complex balancing act‖
between requiring too much and too little disclosure, with the ―legal
concept of materiality provid[ing] the dividing line.‖174 In fact,
Thomas Hazen has gone so far as to say that ―the hallmark of
disclosure for both the 1933 Act registration statement and all 1934
Act filings is embodied in the concept of ‗materiality.‘‖175 For
example, Regulation S-K, Item 303, which provides instructions for
the ―Management‘s Discussion and Analysis‖ section of an issuer‘s
registration statement, references the concept of materiality in guiding
disclosure on liquidity, capital resources, results of operations and
off-balance sheet arrangements.176 The Commission has even
promulgated a ―catch all‖ disclosure rule that turns on materiality: ―In
addition to the information expressly required to be included in a
statement or report, there shall be added such further material
information, if any, as may be necessary to make the required
statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made not misleading.‖177
This dependence on materiality in regulating disclosure appears
only to be increasing. For example, Regulation Fair Disclosure,
promulgated in 2000, prohibits companies registered under the
Exchange Act from selectively disclosing material information to
certain market professionals.178 And the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002179 requires registered companies to disclose ―all material offbalance sheet transactions . . . that may have a material current or
future effect‖ on the issuer‘s financial condition or results of
operations.180 Even more recently, on August 8, 2008, the Advisory

174 Sauer, supra note 30, at 317; see also id. at 318 (―Except for those disclosure items
specifically required by regulatory fiat, public companies need not disclose information that
does not cross the threshold of materiality.‖). But see id. at 320 n.12 (―There are, however,
many disclosure provisions that are not subject to materiality requirements, including the ‗books
and records‘ and ‗internal controls‘ provisions [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934].‖).
175 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 3.4[2] (6th ed. 2009).
176 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2010).
177 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2010).
178 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2010); see also Laura S. Unger, Comm‘r, Special Study:
Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM‘N (Dec. 2001), http://www.
sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (―[L]iability under Reg. FD hinges on the element of
materiality.‖).
179 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and
29 U.S.C.).
180 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j) (2006).
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Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting rendered its final
report to the SEC, in which it stated, among other things:
The FASB or the SEC, as appropriate, should supplement
existing guidance to reinforce the following concepts:
 Those who evaluate the materiality of an error should
make the decision based upon the perspective of a reasonable
investor[;]
 Materiality should be judged based on how an error
affects the total mix of information available to a reasonable
investor, including through a consideration of qualitative and
quantitative factors.181
It is also worth noting that the definition of materiality also
impacts ―gatekeepers‖ like accountants in carrying out their duties.
For example, section 10A of the Exchange Act requires covered
auditors to employ ―procedures designed to provide reasonable
assurance of detecting illegal acts that would have a direct and
material effect on the determination of financial statement
amounts.‖182 Similarly, attorneys are subject to a congressional
mandate to ―report evidence of a material violation of securities
law . . . by the company or any agent thereof.‖183
To the extent that courts routinely find disclosure immaterial on
the basis of safety-valve doctrines that twist the definition of
materiality to the breaking point, they weaken the effectiveness of
these rules by creating unnecessary confusion about the definition of
materiality.184 By relying more on grounds other than materiality to
181 ADVISORY COMM. ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FIN. REPORTING, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM‘N, FINAL REPORT 80 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oca/acifr/
acifr-finalreport.pdf (setting forth numerous points regarding ―materiality‖ and what is
―material‖).
182 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006); see, e.g., In re KPMG LLP, Exchange Act Release No.
50,564, 83 SEC Docket 3052 (Oct. 20, 2004) (―KPMG auditors‘ materiality determinations
were unreasonable in that they only considered quantitative materiality . . . and failed to also
consider qualitative materiality.‖).
183 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006); see also Implementation of Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296, 6303 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205)
(―The final rule does not define the word ‗material,‘ because that term has a well-established
meaning under the federal securities laws and the Commission intends for that same meaning to
apply here.‖ (footnote omitted)).
184 Cf. Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate
Information Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 186 n.218 (2005)
(―As part of 10K annual reports, public entities are required to disclose all ‗material‘ events in
the life of the business that may impact a shareholder‘s investment in the entity. The definition
of materiality, however, is in flux and much discretion regarding whether an event is ‗material‘
for disclosure purposes remains with the company engaging in the disclosures.‖).
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dismiss securities claims, the courts can continue to release the
pressure created by frivolous suits while at the same time arguably
allowing the definition of materiality for purposes of up-front
disclosure decisions to suffer less distortion. Of course, this is all a
matter of degree. And it is not my purpose here to argue that courts
should never dismiss on the basis of immateriality. There may be any
number of cases where judicial resolution of an issue of materiality
will help, rather than hinder, effective application of the disclosure
rules. But the seemingly almost indiscriminate application of safetyvalve doctrines like puffery is unnecessary in these days of
heightened pleading standards, etc., and is likely to unduly water
down the materiality standard.185
IV. THE SOLUTION: SHIFT FOCUS TO
OTHER ELEMENTS OF RULE 10B-5
A. Dependence on Materiality Unnecessary
At the same time that excessive application of the materiality
safety valves is arguably causing problems, it is highly unlikely that
courts could not have dismissed most of these cases on some other
basis. In the following sections I hope to show that with today‘s
heightened pleading standards and recent Supreme Court decisions on
the issues of scienter and loss causation, there is simply no need to
lean on materiality as heavily as in the early days following Basic.
Add to that the challenges plaintiffs face from market efficiency
arguments, the particular limitations on the liability of secondary
actor defendants, statutes of limitations, and the possibility of
sanctions, and it should be the rare case where a pretrial materiality
determination is necessary to stop a strike suit from going forward.186
Securities lawsuits filed in the wake of the financial crisis will
185 Cf. Hoffman, supra note 45, at 565, 586 (citing the theory that higher rates of judicial
immateriality findings ―reduce disclosure pressures,‖ but concluding that their purpose is to
change investor behavior).
186 For example, in the class action context courts now have many acceptable ways to get
―dirty‖ with the facts without having to do an end run around Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974), via a pretrial inquiry into materiality. See id. at 177 (―We find nothing in either
the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action.‖). See generally Patricia Groot, Note, Fraud on the Market Gets a Minitrial: Eisen
Through In re IPO, 58 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1143–44 (2009) (―Since the early 1980s, opposing
attorneys have used Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin and General Telephone Co. of the Southwest
v. Falcon to battle over the proper class certification process in securities class action lawsuits.‖
(footnotes omitted)). My thanks to Professor James D. Cox for this particular perspective on
what courts were likely doing, at least in part, when they developed their overdependence on the
pretrial materiality inquiry.
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certainly raise materiality issues but, as is almost always the case,
many of the other elements of Rule 10b-5 will be up for grabs as well.
For example, as Allen Ferrell and Atanu Saha note, while investors
will likely have little problem identifying significant price drops
associated with certain disclosures connected to the downturn in the
real estate market,
[T]he existence of such a statistically significant and
substantial negative price reaction is hardly the end of the
analysis necessary to assess the claim that investor losses
attributable to this price reaction result in recoverable
damages. There are still the questions of whether, and if so
when, disclosure deficiencies by financial institutions
occurred, whether the requisite scienter associated with these
disclosure deficiencies existed, and whether investor losses
are attributable to these disclosure deficiencies (this last issue
being the requirement of loss causation in Rule 10b-5 causes
of action).187
B. Scienter
The most likely candidate for replacing materiality as the safety
valve of choice is scienter.188 Following passage of the PSLRA, a
securities class-action plaintiff must plead particular facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the speaker acted with the requisite intent to
defraud, or at least acted recklessly in the face of knowledge that his
or her misrepresentation would be traded on by investors.189 In
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,190 the Supreme Court
further clarified that ―[a] complaint will survive . . . only if a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from
the facts alleged.‖191 Given that little serious discovery has taken
187 Ferrell

& Saha, supra note 27, at 97–98.
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that no ―private
cause of action for damages will lie under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any
allegation of ‗scienter‘—intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud‖).
189 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006); see also Tracy Bishop Holton, Stating Causes of
Action for Securities Fraud Under the Private Securities Law Reform Act of 1995, in 26 CAUSES
OF ACTION 109, 126–27 (Clark Kimball, ed., 2d ed. 2004) (―The Ninth Circuit now employs the
most stringent standard for pleading scienter under the PSLRA, holding that reckless conduct,
following the enactment of the PSLRA, only suffices to plead scienter if it rises to the level of
‗deliberate recklessness.‘ The First, Third, and Sixth Circuits in contrast apply a more relaxed
standard, concluding that recklessness suffices to meet the scienter requirement.‖ (citation
omitted)).
190 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
191 Id. at 324; cf. N. PETER RASMUSSEN, FRAUD LITIGATION AFTER DURA, STONERIDGE
188 See
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place at the time of a motion to dismiss, and that the PSLRA actually
stays discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss, the bar
for plaintiffs on this element is extremely high. 192 I contend that
dismissing a suit on the basis of scienter does much less harm to
investor confidence than telling them that they are ―unreasonable‖ for
putting stock in management statements concerning the well-being of
their corporation.
A recent subprime-related case helps illustrate this point. In In re
Radian Securities Litigation,193 the court dismissed plaintiffs‘ claims
that Radian had failed to adequately disclose its subprime exposure
by concluding that the ―plaintiffs‘ allegations . . . do not establish
either motive and opportunity or conscious misbehavior or
recklessness on the part of the defendants. The plaintiffs therefore
have not raised [the necessary] strong inference of scienter.‖194 The
court went on to note:
Even if these allegations were sufficient to establish either
motive and opportunity or conscious misbehavior or
recklessness, however, the Court also concludes that an
inference of scienter with respect to the plaintiffs‘ allegations
is neither cogent nor at least as compelling as the plausible
opposing inferences suggested by the defendants.195
Certainly, pleading scienter is not a completely insurmountable
obstacle. ―[R]ecent circuit court cases have reached different
conclusions on the question of whether an inference may be drawn

TELLABS: SWIMMING UPSTREAM? 8 (2008), available at http://business.cch.com/securities
Law/news/12-11-08a.pdf (―In some circuits, the Tellabs [decision] actually lowered the
pleading standard.‖).
192 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006) (―In any private action arising under this
chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion
to dismiss . . . .‖); cf. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216 n.11 (Del. 1996) (discussing ways
for shareholders to gain information prediscovery using various ―tools at hand‖ like publicly
available sources and access to books and records), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
193 612 F. Supp. 2d 594 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
194 Id. at 608.
195 Id.; see also In re PMI Group Inc. Sec. Litig., Nos. C 08-1405 SI, C 08-1406 SI, 2009
WL 1916934, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 2009) (finding that complaint sufficiently alleged
material misrepresentations related to subprime exposure, as well as loss causation, but granting
motion to dismiss for failure to adequately plead scienter). But see In re Downey Sec. Litig., No.
CV 08-3261-JFW (RZx), 2009 WL 736802 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009) (dismissing subprime
securities suit on basis of lack of scienter, but also ruling in favor of defendants on materiality,
loss causation and lack of misrepresentation); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 07-4451, 2009
WL 1619636 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1999) (dismissing securities claim for failure to plead scienter,
but also opining on the puffery and bespeaks-caution defenses).
AND
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that senior management must be aware of matters involving the
company‘s ‗core operations‘ . . . .‖196 In addition, ―‗collective
scienter‘ may be actionable in the absence of a sufficient inference of
scienter attributable to a particular individual.‖ 197 Plaintiffs may also
still be able to rely on confidential witnesses in at least some
jurisdictions.198 Pleading motive and opportunity may also remain
sufficient, at least in some jurisdictions.199 There also may be some
push back from Congress against what at least some see as an
excessively business-friendly securities regulation regime.200
Regardless, it does appear that the extent to which taking on
additional risk during a financial bubble may constitute evidence of
recklessness will be an issue in litigation arising out of the financial
crisis. 201

196 RASMUSSEN,

supra note 191, at 2.
see also Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2009) (―While most courts have rejected the
collective scienter theory, a handful of courts have permitted some derivation of collective
scienter.‖).
198 Compare Higginbotham v. Baxter Int‘l, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2007)
(―One upshot of the approach that Tellabs announced is that we must discount allegations that
the complaint attributes to five ‗confidential witnesses‘ . . . . It is hard to see how information
from anonymous sources could be deemed ‗compelling‘ or how we could take account of
plausible opposing inferences.‖), with In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Sec. Litig., 592 F. Supp. 2d
323, 342 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (―However, several district courts in this circuit have considered
allegations based on confidential sources after Tellabs without discounting them.‖).
199 See Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 277 n.51 (3d Cir. 2009)
(―The Second Circuit has continued to treat motive and opportunity allegations as a separate
category, but it does not appear to have explicitly examined whether that practice is consistent
with Tellabs.‖).
200 See J. Robert Brown, Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009: Repealing
the PSLRA, THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Nov. 28, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theraceto
thebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/restoring-american-financial-stability-act-of-2009repealing.html (discussing proposed American Financial Stability Act).
201 Cf. In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 693 F. Supp. 2d 241, 269–70 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (―We also find that a reasonable person would deem plaintiffs‘ inference of scienter ‗at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.‘
Defendants argue in their submissions that Ambac‘s financial woes were caused by the global
economic collapse and that this is a ‗fraud by hindsight‘ case. . . . [However, t]he conduct that
plaintiffs allege, if true, would make Ambac an active participant in the collapse of their own
business, and of the financial markets in general, rather than merely a passive victim.‖ (citation
omitted) (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007)));
Kevin LaCroix, Ambac Financial Subprime Securities Suit Dismissal Motions Substantially
Denied, THE D & O DIARY (Feb. 23, 2010) http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/02/articles/
subprime-litigation/ambac-financial-subprime-securities-suit-dismissal-motions-substantiallydenied (―[R]ejecting the ‗hey, the whole economy tanked‘ argument is important. There are a
number of companies about whom it might be alleged, as was alleged here of Ambac, that they
were ‗an active participant in the collapse of their own business, and of the financial markets in
general, rather than merely a passive victim.‘‖). But see Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d
758, 776 n.9 (2d Cir. 2010) (―We emphasize that under the [forward-looking statement]
statutory safe harbor, the plaintiffs must show more than recklessness—an objective inquiry—
they must show actual subjective knowledge.‖).
197 Id.;
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The conclusion of a recent review of subprime litigation is a great
example of why focusing on scienter rather than materiality may be
preferable. As Jonathan Eisenberg points out, scienter ―turns out to be
the perfect predictor of outcomes across all 16 cases‖ reviewed.202 As
Kevin LaCroix summarizes, ―If plaintiffs were not relying on claims
that required pleading scienter (i.e., the ‘33 Act claims) or convinced
the court that the scienter allegations were sufficient, they survived
the motion to dismiss.‖203 Furthermore, ―in the Section 10(b) cases in
which the plaintiffs met the standard for pleading scienter, ‗they also
convinced the court to reject the merits of the other defenses asserted
in the motion to dismiss.‘‖204
C. Loss Causation
Loss causation can also often offer a sound basis for dismissing a
frivolous suit without making a materiality determination.205 As
mentioned earlier, while it is true that the remaining alternative
grounds for dismissing frivolous suits do not perfectly address the
―condoning lies‖ problem like relying on scienter does, it seems fair
to argue that in terms of restoring investor trust, a judicial
pronouncement that, for example, ―you cannot prove your loss was
caused by the lie‖ is still better than ―the lie is unimportant.‖
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,206 the Supreme Court
held that it was ―Congress‘ intent to permit private securities fraud
actions for recovery where, but only where, plaintiffs adequately
allege and prove the traditional elements of causation and loss.‖207
While the precise meaning of Dura continues to be contested,208 it is
fair to say generally that in order to successfully carry their burden on
loss causation, plaintiffs must do more than merely allege an
artificially inflated stock price and subsequent loss—the connection
202 Jonathan Eisenberg, Subprime Securities Class Action Decisions: Who’s Winning,
Who’s Losing and Why?, BLOOMBERG L. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS (2010), available at
http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51&itemID=1962 .
203 Kevin LaCroix, Who’s Winning and Who’s Losing the Dismissal Motions in Subprime
Securities Suits?, The D & O DIARY (Jan. 15, 2010, 4:36 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/
2010/01/articles/subprime-litigation/whos-winning-and-whos-losing-the-dismissal-motions-insubprime-securities-suits.
204 Id. (citing Eisenberg, supra note 202).
205 See Jonathan C. Dickey et al., Subprime-Related Securities Litigation: Where Do We
Go From Here?, 22 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 2, 7 (Apr. 2008) (citing loss causation
as one of ―key defenses‖).
206 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
207 Id. at 346.
208 See, e.g., T. Gorman, Part IV: Pleading Requirements Under Dura—A Circuit Split,
SEC ACTIONS (July 30, 2009, 11:35 AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=1350 (―Following the
Supreme Court‘s decision in Dura, the circuit courts have adopted two and perhaps three
positions on pleading loss causation.‖).
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between the two must be made express.209 ―Following Dura, pleading
loss causation often has evolved into ‗minitrials‘ at very early stages
in the proceedings, and plaintiffs are expected to present expert
testimony that specifically links the alleged fraud to the financial
losses.‖210
Failure to plead loss causation can be a particularly powerful
defense in a market where overall stock prices have fallen rapidly in
response to the recent crisis.211 As N. Peter Rasmussen notes, this is
so because ―investors can find it difficult to attribute stock price
declines to company-specific fraud rather than general market
conditions.‖212 As the Tenth Circuit stated in In re Williams Securities
Litigation–WCG Subclass,213 ―[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of
showing that his losses were attributable to the revelation of the fraud
and not the myriad other factors that affect a company‘s stock
price.‖214
The need to link the alleged misstatement to the loss arguably also
permits issuers to time their corrective disclosures in such a way as to
make loss causation all the more difficult to prove. As the Fifth
Circuit stated in Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance
Telecom, Inc.,215 ―when unrelated negative statements are announced
209 Cf. id. (discussing the several pleading standards the circuit courts employ for a loss
causation claim).
210 RASMUSSEN, supra note 191, at 2. Cf. In re MIVA, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 2:05-cv-201FtM-29DNF, 2009 WL 3821146, at **9–13 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009) (accepting magistrate
judge‘s recommendation to grant the defendants‘ motion for summary judgment where the
plaintiffs presented extensive expert analysis on the effect of nine alleged misstatements, but
failed to specifically connect the two statements that survived dismissal to the loss).
211 But cf. Steven J. Toll, Coming to Terms with Loss Causation after Dura: A Response to
Professors Partnoy, Ferrell, and Saha, 35 J. CORP. L. 189, 189 (2009) (arguing that loss
causation presents no great obstacle to plaintiffs); Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Does Dura Matter?
Loss Causation and the Implications of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo 2 (July 31, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442026 (suggesting that Dura
will not have much of an effect).
212 RASMUSSEN, supra note 191, at 2; see also Kevin M. LaCroix, Subprime-Related
Securities Litigation: An Interim Update, THE D & O DIARY (Sep. 9, 2009), http://www.dando
diary.com/2009/09/articles/subprime-litigation/subprimerelated-securities-litigation-an-interimupdate (―[I]n both the lawsuit that Luminent Mortgage Corporation filed against Merrill Lynch
and in the First Marblehead subprime-related securities class action lawsuit, the courts quoted
with approval language from a prior RICO case in which the Second Circuit said ‗when the
plaintiff‘s loss coincides with a market-wide phenomenon causing comparable losses to other
investors, the prospect that plaintiffs‘ loss was caused by fraud decreases.‘‖).
213 558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2009).
214 Id. at 1137 (emphasis added). But see J. Robert Brown, Using Loss Causation to Repeal
Rule 10b-5: In re: Williams Securities Litigation (Part 5), THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Mar.
24, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/using-loss-causationto-repeal-rule-10b-5-in-re-williams-sec-3.html (―The impact of Williams is to make it harder to
bring meritorious fraud suits. It is an approach not required by the antifraud provisions and not
required by Dura. It is consistent with the position of this Blog that the new administration may
discover that the biggest obstacle to reform lies not in Congress but in the courts.‖).
215 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007).
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contemporaneous of a corrective disclosure, the plaintiff must prove
‗that it is more probable than not that it was this negative statement,
and not other unrelated negative statements, that caused a significant
amount of the decline.‘‖216 Thus, we should not be surprised if these
type of ―mixed message‖ cases routinely crop up for dismissal.
To be sure, as with other elements of Rule 10b-5, there remain
unsettled questions about what is required to effectively plead loss
causation. Some courts may resolve this current uncertainty in a
plaintiff-friendly manner.217 In addition, further clarification will
likely also come from the Supreme Court sooner or later and there is
at least some chance (however small) that subsequent Supreme Court
rulings will lessen the burdens on plaintiffs in terms of pleading loss
causation.218 For the time being, however, failure to plead loss
causation appears to be a strong defense.
Of course, as with other alternatives, the fact that loss causation
can effectively serve the safety valve role is of little worth vis-à-vis
the issues discussed herein if courts continue to dismiss on the basis
of loss causation and materiality. For example, in another subprimerelated case, In re Downey Securities Litigation,219 the court
dismissed the plaintiffs‘ claims on the basis of, among other things
(including lack of scienter), failure to adequately plead loss
causation.220 Unfortunately, the court in Downey also unnecessarily
opined on the materiality of the alleged misrepresentations,
concluding that statements affirming the company‘s ―strong‖ capital
position were ―‗too vague to be actionable.‘‖221 The court‘s
216 Id.

at 270 (quoting Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir.

2004)).
217 Cf. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009)
(per curiam) (holding that the district court erroneously placed the burden of proving loss
causation on the plaintiff at precertification stage). The court elaborated: ―To be successful, a
securities class-action plaintiff must thread the eye of a needle made smaller and smaller over
the years by judicial decree and congressional action. Those ever higher hurdles are not,
however, intended to prevent viable securities actions from being brought.‖Id.
218 See Nate Raymond, In 5th Circuit, Justice O’Connor Revives Flowserve Securities
Class Action, LAW.COM (June 23, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/digestTAL.jsp?id=
1202431650631&Fifth_Circuit_Revives_Flowserve_Securities_Class_Action (―[T]he question
of loss causation at the class certification stage seems headed to the Supreme Court, given the
continuing controversy among the circuits on how to deal with loss causation in the wake of the
Supreme Court‘s ruling in Dura Pharmaceuticals.‖); cf. N. Peter Rasmussen, 5th Circuit
Remains Hostile to Securities Class Actions, JIM HAMILTON‘S WORLD SEC. REG. (Feb. 22,
2010, 9:48 AM), http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/5th-circuit-remains-hostileto.html (―While all fraud plaintiffs must plead loss causation under the Supreme Court‘s Dura
decision, they must prove loss causation in the 5th Circuit at the class certification stage.‖).
219 No. CV 08-3261-JFW (RZx), 2009 WL 736802 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2009).
220 Id. at *14–15.
221 Id. at *6 (quoting In re Calpine Corp. Sec. Lit., 288 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1088 (N.D. Cal.
2003)).
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conclusion that as a matter of law assurances of a ―strong‖ capital
position are too vague to be actionable seems highly questionable and
was, as is so often the case, unnecessary.
D. Reliance and Rebutting the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption
Reliance can also serve as its own safety valve. While defendants
in many of the relevant cases face the presumption of reliance created
under the fraud-on-the-market theory adopted in Basic, that
presumption is rebuttable.222 As the Supreme Court said in Basic,
―[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the
plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be
sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.‖223 For example, as
discussed above, this is where the truth-on-the-market defense may
properly be applied without creating the problems associated with
dismissing claims on the basis of immateriality. The truth-on-themarket defense should be particularly salient in current and pending
subprime-related litigation because:
Based on the global fact story that is emerging, it would seem
that defendants in some of the cases will have powerful
defenses to reliance based upon the publicly-disclosed facts
concerning the downturn in the subprime market, and the
copious risk factor disclosure that companies were
publishing, and Wall Street analysts were writing about,
during the time period of late 2006 through the summer of
2007.224
In addition, there may be cases where the market is in fact not
efficient for purposes of applying the presumption.225 Finally,
following the Supreme Court‘s recent opinion in Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,226 certain
222 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988); cf. 14 WILLIAM MEADE
FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6864
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003) (―While reliance in nondisclosure cases is presumed from materiality,
affirmative evidence of nonreliance may defeat this presumption.‖).
223 Basic, 485 U.S. at 248.
224 Dickey, supra note 205, at 6. See also Subprime-Related Securities Litigation: Early
Trends, GIBSON DUNN (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/
SubprimeRelatedSecuritiesLitigationEarlyTrends.aspx (providing a general overview of trends
in subprime-related securities litigation).
225 See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285–87 (D.N.J. 1989) (setting forth
five factors ―which, if alleged, might give rise to an inference that [the defendant‘s company]
traded in an efficient market‖).
226 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
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defendants may be too far removed from the securities transaction for
their actions to have been relied upon by plaintiffs.227 I will briefly
address dismissal of secondary actors, pleading standards, statutes of
limitations and sanctions in the following section.
E. Dismissing Secondary Actors, Pleading Standards,
Statutes of Limitations, and Sanctions
Why rule on the materiality of certain misstatements if you can
just dismiss the case because the defendants are not proper parties
under Rule 10b-5? While ―[i]n many instances of significant financial
fraud, issuers lack the resources to compensate harmed investors, and
plaintiffs have turned to third-party defendants such as vendors,
financial institutions and gatekeepers,‖ the Supreme Court‘s decision
in Stoneridge ―significantly narrowed the scope of actions against
third-party defendants.‖228 In Stoneridge, the Court ―concluded that
the private right of action did not reach suppliers, who entered into
sham transactions with a cable operator, because investors in the
cable company did not rely upon the suppliers‘ statements or
representations.‖229 In other words, reliance may well be the critical
element when dealing with secondary actors.230 Add to Stoneridge the
Supreme Court‘s prior decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver,231 where the Court denied a private aiding
and abetting claim under Rule 10b-5, and you have a meaningful
barrier between plaintiffs and many of the parties they would like to
sue.232 Both Stoneridge and Central Bank certainly have their
227 Id. at 166–67 (―In these circumstances the investors cannot be said to have relied upon
any of respondents‘ deceptive acts in the decision to purchase or sell securities; and as the
requisite reliance cannot be shown, respondents have no liability to petitioner under the implied
right of action.‖).
228 RASMUSSEN, supra note 191, at 2; cf. LaCroix, supra note 201 (―One of the
characteristics of many of these subprime and credit crisis related lawsuits is the extent to which
the plaintiffs are seeking to impose liability on the gatekeepers of the target companies.‖).
229 Gail O‘Gradney, Recent Cases—Supreme Court: Secondary Actors Not Liable For
Participation in Scheme Under § 10(b), 26-02 FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER ARTICLE I (Feb.
2008).
230 See, e.g., Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2010)
(rejecting ―creator‖ standard and holding ―that a secondary actor can be held liable in a private
damages action brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5(b) only for false statements attributed to the
secondary-actor defendant at the time of dissemination. Absent attribution, plaintiffs cannot
show that they relied on defendants‘ own false statements.‖ (footnote omitted)), reh’g and reh’g
en banc denied, July 26, 2010; cf. id. at 160 (―[P]laintiffs‘ Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) claims for
‗scheme liability‘ are foreclosed by the Supreme Court‘s decision in Stoneridge.‖).
231 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
232 See Thomas O. Gorman, Dura and Iqbal, Two Decisions Having an Impact, SEC
ACTIONS (Oct. 22, 2009, 2:42 AM), http://www.secactions.com/?p=1615 (―While the complaint
alleges a series of misstatements, after the Supreme Court‘s decision in Central Bank of Denver
. . . , there is no liability for aiding and abetting. Accordingly, the auditors can only be held
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critics,233 and legislation has even been introduced seeking to overturn
the decisions,234 but as of this writing, the decisions stand as another
set of litigation safety valves—available in cases involving secondary
actors—that do not require a court to opine on materiality.
Turning to pleading standards, while the safety-valve role of
heightened pleading standards has already been discussed in
connection with pleading scienter and loss causation, recent Supreme
Court decisions suggest heightened pleading standards may favor
defendants in securities cases even may broadly. As Jonathan Tuttle
explains:
Since the 1995 passage of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (―PSLRA‖), defendants in civil securities class
actions have focused their attacks on the adequacy of
complaints on the PSLRA‘s stringent requirements for
pleading scienter and the specificity requirements for
pleading fraud found in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9(b). More
recently, however, three Supreme Court decisions have
breathed new life – and new force – into the general pleading
standards of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a). These cases, Dura v.
Broudo, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
provide opportunities for defense lawyers to attack securities
class action complaints on a much more basic level and create

liable, if at all, for misstatements or omissions they made.‖); cf. 2 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL,
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 27:58 (2009) (noting that there is disagreement as to the
viability of group pleading both for purposes statement attribution and scienter).
233 See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay on Stoneridge
Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 448–
49 (2009) (―Stoneridge . . . is worth academic discussion because it illustrates how utterly
irrational the law governing private securities fraud actions has become.‖); Klock, supra note
161, at 336 (―The result of the Court‘s holding creates moral hazard, whereby economic
incentives to behave ethically are removed and positive economic incentives to engage in
unethical conduct are created.‖).
234 See J. Robert Brown, Overturning Stoneridge and the Symbolic Passing of an Era,
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG (Aug 14, 2009, 6:00 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org
/shareholder-rights/overturning-stoneridge-and-the-symbolic-passing-of-an-era.html
(―[T]he
2009 Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act (S. 1551) would authorize
actions against ‗any person that knowingly or recklessly provides substantial assistance to
another person in violation of‘ federal securities laws. . . . In introducing the Bill, Senator
Specter specifically noted that it was intended to overrule both Stoneridge and Central Bank.‖);
see also Crimmins, supra note 55 (―Section 929-O of the Act provides for the SEC to impose
aiding and abetting liability on persons who ‗recklessly‘ provide substantial assistance to
someone who violates the Exchange Act. . . . In addition, the Act provides, for the first time, for
aiding and abetting liability under the Securities Act, the Investment Company Act and the
Investment Advisers Act. The Act . . . directs the GAO to study whether private plaintiffs
should also be allowed to sue aiders and abettors.‖ (citations omitted)).
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new obstacles for plaintiffs trying to survive a motion to
dismiss.235
The requirements in Dura for effectively pleading loss causation
have already been discussed.236 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,237
the Court imposed a ―plausibility‖ standard for reviewing claims
under the Sherman Act.238 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,239 the Supreme Court
extended the Twombly plausibility standard to all civil actions.240 At
least one commentator has noted the possibility that courts may read
Iqbal as imposing pleading requirements even more stringent than the
PSLRA.241 Iqbal may also impact the pleading of loss causation in
courts applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to Dura.242 At
the very least, while much uncertainty about the implications of Iqbal
exists, the strong negative response to the decision from at least some
quarters suggests the decision should not be taken lightly.243
235 Jonathan R. Tuttle, Back to Basics: Taking Advantage of Rule 8(a)’s New Teeth to
Attack Securities Complaints, in SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2009, at
379, 381 (Practising Law Inst. ed., 2009).
236 See supra Part IV.C. Cf. Mark Herrmann, et al. , Plausible Denial: Should Congress
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 162 (2009), available at
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=24 (arguing that ―Dura may have
facilitated part of the analysis in Twombly, but it is light years away from Iqbal.‖).
237 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
238 See id. at 556 (―In applying these general standards to a § 1 claim, we hold that stating
such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.‖).
239 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
240 See id. at 1949 (―To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‗state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘ A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.‖ (citation omitted)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)).
241 See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: Defining the
Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 505, 535–36 (2009) (arguing that ―[t]o read Twombly and Iqbal as requiring that plaintiffs
plead facts sufficient to exclude ‗more likely explanations‘ would make Rule 8‘s general
pleading requirements even more stringent than the PSLRA‘s heightened fact pleading
requirements‖ and that while this result would be ―ridiculous,‖ some courts are apparently
already doing that).
242 Cf. Evan Hill, Comment, The Rule 10B-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in
Private Securities Fraud Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2659, 2659 (2010) (―[I]n Dura‘s wake, the circuit courts have fashioned divergent
standards with respect to pleading loss causation. The courts currently apply pleading standards
ranging from the lenient and generally applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to the
stringent and fraud-specific Rule 9(b).‖). See generally, Kenneth Crowley & Yuri Mikulka, The
New Breed of Financial-Crisis Class Actions: New Theories, New Defendants and New
Defenses, ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. & REG. REP., July 14, 2009, at 1 (―According to Iqbal, the
heightened pleading standards apply not only to intent, but to other elements of a claim.‖).
243 See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Groups Unite to Keep Cases on Docket: Plaintiffs’ Lawyers
Seek to Stop Dismissals After Iqbal Decision, NAT. L.J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1 (―Sen. Arlen
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Turning to statutes of limitations, plaintiffs generally must bring a
Rule 10b-5 claim within two years of discovery and five years of the
violation.244 If plaintiffs‘ lawyers complain about it, there is a good
chance defendants will want to rely upon it. Following the voluntary
dismissal of McClellan v. Regions Financial Corporation,245 a
subprime-related case, the attorney for the plaintiffs complained,
―there‘s a problem with securities law time limits in cases like
Regions, where subprime investments were concealed for years.‖246
Certainly, time may often be on the side of defendants, particularly in
the more complex corporate fraud cases.247
Finally, if the real concern motivating dependence on materiality
safety valves is frivolous litigation, courts may want to consider
increasing (appropriately, of course) their use of sanctions. For
example, attorneys for plaintiffs in the securities class action of In re
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. Securities
Litigation248 were ordered to pay all the defendants‘ attorney fees

Specter, (D-Pa.), introduced a bill in July that would return pleading standards to the preTwombly status.‖).
244 See Joseph Robertson, Note, Inquiry Notice Gone Awry: A Doctrine Abused in
Debenedictis v. Merrill Lynch, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1491, 1492 n.5 (2009) (―[S]ince Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the courts have applied a two-years-after-discovery
period with a five-year ultimate bar to these claims.‖); Friedman v. Rayovac Corp., 295 F. Supp.
2d 957, 974–76 (W.D. Wis. 2003) (discussing the statute of limitations for claiming a violation
of the Securities Act)). Cf. James Hamilton, Leahy Antifraud Amendment Approved by Senate
Conferees, JIM HAMILTON‘S WORLD SEC. REG. (June 23, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://jimham
iltonblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/leahy-antifraud-amendment-approved-by.html (―The Leahy
Amendment would add new Section 1079A to the bill to amend the US criminal code to
increase the statute of limitations for securities fraud violations from five to six years . . . .‖).
245 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, McClellan v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. 2:09-cv01976-UNAS-RBP (N.D. Ala. Nov. 13, 2009) (entering the plaintiff‘s voluntary dismissal of his
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)).
246 Sheri Qualters, Securities Fraud Suits Resurface, NAT. L.J., Nov. 23, 2009, at 1.
McClellan was apparently a proxy fraud claim, which would be subject to an even shorter
statute of limitations. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Olofson, No. 08-2344-CM, 2009 WL
1580296, at *4 (D. Kan. June 3, 2009) (―A plaintiff must bring claims under Section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act within ‗one year after the plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation,
and in no event more than three years after such violation.‘‖ (quoting In re iBasis, Inc.
Derivative Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220 (D. Mass. 2007))).
247 See David Ingram, Senators Express Impatience with Scope of Fraud Prosecutions,
NAT. L.J., Dec. 10, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202436218454
&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (―Robert Khuzami, director of enforcement for the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and Kevin Perkins, assistant director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, said cases against executives and directors are especially difficult because the
defendants are relatively sophisticated. ‗Many times they are developing defenses as they go
along, and it takes a long time to unwind those,‘ Perkins said.‖). But see Merck & Co. v.
Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784, 1798 (2010) (―[T]erms such as ‗inquiry notice‘ and ‗storm warnings‘
may be useful . . . . [b]ut the limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff thereafter
discovers or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered ‗the facts constituting the
violation‘ . . . .‖).
248 No. 08 Civ. 11278(DLC), 2010 WL 1875728 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2010).
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after failing to perform the necessary diligence to ensure a claim was
proper, such failure rising in the eyes of the court to ―gross negligence
bordering on recklessness.‖249 The PSLRA mandates judicial review
for, and imposition of, sanctions for frivolous litigation.250
V. CRITICISMS
I want to briefly address some possible objections to my
suggestion that courts reduce their dependence on materiality as a
means to thwart frivolous suits because such dependence effectively
and unnecessarily condones lying, twists the definition of materiality
to the breaking point, and creates conflicts with the disclosure rules.
One possible criticism is that a reduction in judicial ―guidance‖ on
the issue of materiality would hurt more than it would help. One
might respond to this argument, however, by pointing out that there is
at least some evidence to suggest that ―the accumulated body of
published case law provides limited guidance for decisionmaking,‖251 suggesting that the loss would not be that great.
Another possible criticism is that judicial ―leniency‖ in granting
dismissals on the basis of materiality is necessary to offset the costs
associated with the SEC‘s ―zealousness‖ in bringing cases and
defining materiality in such a way as to provide maximum protection
to the retail investor.252 Again, if cost is the issue, one may reply that
the uncertainty associated with judicial materiality determinations is
also costly.253 More importantly, I am not arguing that courts should
give up their safety valve ―operator‖ function. Rather, I am arguing
that they should stop depending on materiality as their primary tool
whenever possible.254
What about the argument that shifting the focus of Rule 10b-5
claims to other elements will result in an increased cost for experts,
since loss causation and reliance (for example) are often factintensive issues? The answer is that courts are already engaging in
249 Id.

at *6.
U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2006) (listing sanctions for abusive litigation).
251 Sauer, supra note 30, at 319.
252 Cf. Larry Ribstein, The Regulatory Risks of Behavioral Finance, IDEOBLOG (Oct. 5,
2009, 9:14 AM), http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/10/the-regulatory-risks-ofbehavioral-finance.html (―[L]et us not forget that regulators can be irrational too . . . .‖).
253 Cf. Sauer, supra note 30, at 319 (―Th[e] continuing uncertainty has increased the cost of
generating and verifying financial information and has added to the amount of litigation
burdening the corporate world.‖).
254 This may be more difficult in some types of securities litigation outside the Rule 10b-5
context. See Eisenberg, supra note 202 (noting that Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities
Act do not require a plaintiff to prove scienter); 14 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 222, § 6864
(―The liability imposed by Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933
generally does not require a plaintiff to show reliance.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
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these analyses, likely to ensure that when the case is appealed there
will be multiple grounds upon which to affirm. This actually suggests
another cost of my approach—that is, the cost of some cases being
reversed that might have been upheld had the alleged misstatement
also been found to be immaterial. But, it is the rare case that is
reversed but for materiality, and as to those cases where the issue
does manifest, I believe the overall benefit of reducing judicial
dependence on materiality should outweigh the cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts create a number of problems when they rely excessively on
materiality in dismissing what they deem to be frivolous claims. First,
the repeated immunization of lies both condones corporate deceit and
mocks investor trust. Second, the various safety-valve doctrines
conflict with the Supreme Court‘s guidance on the definition and
analysis of materiality. Finally, the ―watering down‖ of materiality
creates problems for those trying to determine what disclosures are
required under the SEC‘s rules, which often mandate a materiality
assessment. The time is right for courts to look to the other elements
of Rule 10b-5 to dismiss claims they deem frivolous. This is so
because satisfying those other elements has become more difficult
since the Supreme Court‘s decision in Basic, and the current financial
crisis provides both the need and opportunity to restore investor
confidence by ceasing to call lies immaterial.

